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Abstract

In recent years computer viruses have become increasingly significant as a form of
computer abuse. By virtue of their reproductive capability, computer viruses can
have cumulative and potentially catastrophic effects to the many people who use
those affected computers. There is a growing concern in the computing community
about these forms of electronic vandalism. This concern arises from the possible
damage to stored information on which the work depends and the ensuing
disruption of the work-place.
Although the vandalism or purposeful abuse by introducing computer
viruses to computer systems was originally mainly an American experience,
research reports published by the Australian Computer Abuse Research Bureau
(ACARB) support the claim that computer viruses have become increasingly
significant as a form of computer abuse in Australia in recent years. Apart from
ACARB's figures, there is minimal empirical research of a similar nature being
conducted to investigate computer viruses as a form of computer abuse in
Australia. In this study, an attempt has been made to investigate the problem, albeit
on a limited scope.
In this study, the infection types and rates of IBM PC viruses in limited
government IT organizations in Western Australia were investigated. In addition,
this study has made an attempt to validate Spafford's speculation that less than 10
viruses (out of a minimum of 374) account for 90%, of infections in the Western
Australian environment.
This study was descriptive in nature in that a fact-finding survey based on
questionnaires and standardized interviews was conducted in State Government IT
organizations in Western Australia in order to obtain data on which the research

V

findings can be based. The data gathering instrument for this study was a
standardized questionnaire which comprised limited choice questions directed at
obtaining such information as infection rates of various types of computer viruses.
The questionnaire was field tested to eliminate ambiguous or biased items and to
improve format, both for ease of understanding and facility in analyzing results.
The questionnaire was used by the interviewer as a basis for the interview so that
the potential for subjectivity and bias can be reduced.
Before the commencement of this study, a letter of transmittal was sent to
the prospective participants in order to request their participations. Confirmation of
participation was sought through telephone calls. A very high response rate
(87.5%, n = 42) for this study was achieved. This is taken as an assurance that
reasonable representation of the state government sector for the study is achieved.
Prior to commencement of this study, approval was sought from the
University Committee for the Conduct of Ethical Research since this study will
involve human subjects. During the interview, subjects were informed of the
purpose of the study, that there will be no compulsion to participate in the study
and that they will be free to withdraw from further participation in the study at any
time they desire.
The results of the survey and its implications are provided in chapters 5 and
6. In conclusion, the research ratifies the proposition that currently very few of the
IBM PC viruses contribute to the vast majority of infections in the W estem
Australian work-place.
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Chapter One
Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

1.1.1 Computer viruses as a form of computer crime1
Computers potentially offer a tremendous advantage in providing accurate and
timely information for making decisions, but their accessibility and proliferation can

1

This paper commences with the proposition that deliberate development of a computer
virus for computer abuse with malicious intent is a form of computer crime. Although
this position is dependent upon the laws of the country in which the action talces place, it
is reasonable to talce the majority position which would describe the action as criminal
since the activity is not contained within country boundaries.

It should be noted that there are subtle differences between the terms "computer
crime", "computer fraud" and "computer abuse". For example, unlike fraud the release of
a computer virus is unlikely to cause financial gain to the culprit. Indeed, there have
been examples of computer viruses being released without deliberate intent to perform
damage, as pointed out by Leiss (1990, p. 37). Nevertheless, the final outcome on the
victim is still the same.
Notwithstanding, it is beyond the scope of this paper to made an attempt to
differentiate the exact delineation between these terms. Thus, in the remaining of this
paper, these terms will be used interchangeably.

LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992

Honours Thesis

pose major security problems. Since the first documented computer crime case in
1958 (Parker, 1976, p. 34), the fraudulent misuse of computers, according to
Palmer & Potter (1989, p. 14), is now a major criminal activity. 2 Not only has
computer fraud increased in frequency, it has increased in sophistication as well.
Today, the computing community is dealing with what the New York Times vividly

2

For example, a "Commitment to Security" survey of 3,500 computer security
professionals conducted by the National Centre for Computer Crime Data (NCCCD) in
the United States in 1989 revealed that the annual cost incurred as a result of computer
abuse in the U.S. is estimated at $5.5 billion, 930 person years, and 15.3 computer years
("News track", 1989, p. 657; Bloombecker, 1989; Baker, 1991, p. 4). The average
annual known computer abuse losses from the assessable cases are $109,000, 365 person
hours, and 26 computer hours. NCCCD data has previously noted that 45% of reported
cases of computer crime in the U.S. are computer-related fraud (Bloombecker, 1988).
Statistics from the Financial Crimes Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) suggest, however, a higher average cost per incident of $430,000, with annual
losses in the U.S. estimated at $100 billion (Kamay & Adam, 1990, p. 10). As for
Australia, data gathered from the Australian Computer Abuse Research Bureau
(ACARB) indicate that from 1978 to May 1990, the average annual known computer
abuse losses from 151 assessable cases in Australia is $100,749 (Kamay et al., 1990), as
shown in Table 2.
A survey carried out by BIS Applied Systems Limited, a computer consultancy
firm in the United Kingdom, indicated that the average amount defrauded per incident
in the U.K. has increased from £31,000 in 1983 to £262,000 in 1986 and then to
£483,000 in 1989 (Wong & Watt, 1990, p. 35). This represents a 15-fold increase in
value over the three periods. The maximum loss recorded has also gone up from
£500,000 to £10 million and then £27 million over the three periods.

2
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calls "the letter bomb of the computer age: computer viruses" 3 ("Letter bomb",
1988). With the advent of electronic mail, computer viruses have become more
than the letter bomb of the computer age, as bemoaned by Zajac (1988, p. 3), "they
have become a global threat."

It seems evident (Fites, Johnston, & Kratz, 1992, p. 11; Kamay et al., 1990,
, p. 17; Denning, 1990, p. xiv; Leiss, 1990, p. 4) that the real reason why computer
viruses are becoming a serious problem, and could be catastrophic in the future, is
linked to one of the long-term trends in the development of computers:
connectivity. 4
The following well-publicized incident (Denning, 1989; Rochlis & Eichin,
1989; Spafford, 1989; Markoff, 1988; Eisenberg, Gries, Hartmanis, Holcomb,

3

A computer virus is generally defined as a set of instructions, usually attached to the
beginning or end of a program file, that propagate themselves through computer systems
and/or networks, deliberately set to do things unwanted by the legitimate owners of those
systems. (See section 1.1. 3 for a definition of a computer virus.)

4

The advent of networking, especially local area networks (LANs), in the second half of
the 1980s had far reaching consequences. The systems software (e.g., file systems,
operating systems) of PCs was basically designed with a single user in mind. As soon as
PCs were connected to each other (and to minicomputer or mainframe, or both), this
single-user world view was shattered; yet the operating systems of many personal work
stations did not change drastically. On the one hand, networking was added to enhance
the functionality of the older systems, on the other hand, even newer systems sometimes
ran older systems software, usually for reasons of compatibility. "As a result," Leiss
(1990, p. 7) argues, "safeguard against (accidental or malicious) undesired changes of
data and software ... are substantially inadequate." Leiss (1990, p. 9) goes on to add that

"many problems stemming from virus attacks can ultimately be traced back to this
change in the computing milieu."

3
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Lynn, & Santoro, 1989; Montz, 1990a; Gardner, 1989; Ferbrache, 1990) is edited
from the above sources to illustrate the extent to which connectivity has
exacerbated the computer viruses problem.
On November 2, 1988, a graduate student at Cornell University released a
"worm" program5 into ARP ANET (Denning, 1989/1990; Quarterman & Hoskins,
1986/1990, p. 42), a North American academic networking system that includes
electronic mail capabilities. Within hours, it had spread to several thousand
computers attached to the ARPA Internet. 6 Over an eight-hour period the worm
invaded between 2,500 and 3,000 Digital Equipment Corporation's VAX
computers and Sun Microsystems' Sun 3 systems running the Berkeley and AT&T
UNIX operating system version 4.3 at such major Internet sites as Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), the University of California at Berkeley, three
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) facilities, and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. 7 The scope of the break-ins came as a great

5

The program may not be a virus by the definition used in this paper, but rather a form of
worm. The difference is academic: the program did not attach itself to any other program

while spreading, it only sent copies of itself through a mail system, and is thus not a
computer virus in the strictest sense. See the next section for the discussion of a worm.

6

The ARPA Internet (Quarterman & Hoskins, 1986/1990, p. 40) is an internetwork of
several networks, of which ARPANET is the oldest. Internet exists to facilitate sharing
of resources at participating organizations and free exchange of research findings among
researchers through electronic mail and other services, as well as to provide a testbed for
new developments in networking.

7

This machine base was a small subset of the hosts connected to the Internet. Ferbrache
(1990, p. 14) argues that the diversity of Internet host platforms was a significant factor
in reducing the spread of the worm. Had Morris extended his attacks to the common Sun

4
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surprise to almost everyone, despite the fact that UNIX has long been known to
have some security weaknesses, as discussed in Grampp & Morris (1984) and Reid
(1987).
Computers infested with the worm were soon labouring under a huge load
of programs that looked like innocuous "shell" programs (command interpreters.)
The worm program expropriated the resources of each invaded computer by
replicating rampantly and clogging them with many copies of itself, but did no
apparent damage. Attempts to kill these programs were ineffective: new copies
would appear from Internet connections as fast as old copies were deleted. Many
of the computers had to be disconnected from the network until all copies of this
prolific worm program could be eradicated and the security loopholes the worm
used to gain entry could be plugged. The worm program had done no permanent
damage to stored files or programs, but its disruptive spread had cost hundreds of
hours of human effort and computer time. 8

386i and Sun 4 systems, Ferbrache (1990, p. 14) maintains, the impact of the worm
would have been far greater.
The immediacy of communication, the ability to copy source and binary files
from machine to machine, and the widespread availability of both source and expertise
allowed personnel throughout the U.S. to work together to solve the infection despite the
widespread disconnection of parts of the network are some other factors perceived by
Spafford (1989) that have helped to defeat the worm.
8

Estimated losses from individual sites are generally not available. However, NASA's
Ames Research Centre and the U.S. Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory estimated their dollar losses at $72,500 and $100,000, respectively
(Montz, 1990b, p. 457). These losses were attributed primarily to lost staff time. Report
from the NCCCD (cited in Adams, 1989, p. 10) points out that the cost of cleaning out

s
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This incident gained much publicity9 and reactions 10 in the computing
community perhaps because it highlights the subtlety and danger of attacks by

systems in just one user organization, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, was
estimated at US $250,000.
9

The worm's fast and massive infestation was so portentous that the New York Times, the
Wall Street Journal and USA Today gave it front-page coverage. It was the subject of
two articles in Science magazine (Marshall, 1988a, 1988b). These accounts said that
over 6,000 computers were infested, but later estimates (Denning, 1989, p. 126) put the
actual number between 2,500 and 3,000, about 5% of those attached to the Internet.

10

Shortly after the Internet incident, several major groups issued public statements
decrying the incident, .calling for more responsibility by network users and citing as
unethical any disruption of the intended use of networks, wasting of resources through
disruption, destruction of computer-based information, compromising of privacy (Farber,
1989; Cerf, l 989). These groups include the board of directors of the CSNET and
BITNET networks, the advisory panel for the division of networking and research
infrastructure at the National Science Foundation, and the Internet Activities Board. The
president of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) at the time of the Internet
incident called on the computing community to make network hygiene a standard
practice (Kocher, 1989, p. 6).
In the aftermath of the Internet incident the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD)
established the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at the Software
Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh. The CERT was
established to assemble a network of experts to monitor attacks on computers, coordinate
responses, and issue advisories. The CERT deals with attacks of all kinds, including
intruders, worms, and viruses (Scherlis, Squires, & Pethia, 1990, p. 498). Similar
organizations have been established by the U.S. Department of Energy (Computer
Incident Advisory Capability), the U.S. Defence Data Network (security co-ordination
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computer viruses and worms on computers attached to open networks11 : the
potential for loss of valuable information was enormous, and an actual loss may
have been devastating to the many people who used those computers. The
occurrence of this incident has prompted Fites et al. (1992) to assert:
It is no longer true that computers are reasonably safe from each
other. . . . Connectivity means that . . . we're all susceptible to
attack. (p. 26)

The attacks on computers not attached to networks by viruses could prove to have
equally disastrous consequences because viruses restricted to personal computers
(PCs) have also infected computers on a global scale. The Brain virus, for
example, is reported (e.g., Hafuer, 1988, p. 53; Grocott, Palmer, & Travis, 1990)
to have infected an untold number of PCs as it travelled throughout the world.
Computer viruses (and related threats) are thus a form of computer crime
that is arguably more insidious than any other because of the sheer number of
computers and people that could be affected, the anonymity of the perpetration,
and the often apparent absence of reason on the part of the perpetrator. By virtue
of their reproductive capability, computer viruses can have cumulative and
potentially catastrophic effects to the many people who used those affected
computers.

centre) and by NASA (SPAN network centre), according to Ferbrache (1990, p. 17).
Each co-operates closely in exchanging information on known security problems.
11

Denning (1989, p. 128) maintains that since the Internet is designed for openness, it is
impossible to draw conclusions about closed networks from this incident.
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1.1.2 Computer viruses and related threats
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that several other terms are often
used in discussions about computer viruses. The terms include: Worm, bacteria
(rabbits), Trojan horse, logic bomb, and trapdoor (backdoor). These are terms that
are often used interchangeably with computer virus by the layman. 12 To the general
reader the difference between these types of computer virus may be slight but to
the technician they are significant and reflect a position on definition. Thus it is
worth giving brief explanation of these terms. 13
A worml 4 is a software program that can run on its own, in contrast to a
virus. The worm is generally designed to search for idle computer memory; it then

12

For example, in the Internet incident, some of the media reports (e.g, Markoff, 1988;
Jackson, 1988; Alexander, 1988) have mistakenly called the invading program a virus
rather than a worm. Denning (1989, p. 127) argues that the mistaken use of terminology
in this incident has "exaggerated the seriousness of what had happened" because the
worm is a less insidious attack (when compared to a virus), given that "the security
weaknesses in the Internet service programs have been repaired" shortly after the attack
and that "it is unlikely that an attack against these specific weaknesses could be launched
again."

13

The reader is referred to the papers written by Murray (1988), and Rochlis et al. (1989)
which contain extensive discussions about terminology, the differentiation between
terms, and the appropriateness of calling a computer virus a virus.

14

Some observers (Denning, 1990, p. 192; Shoch & Hupp, 1982, p. 172) suggest
that the concept that a worm that would "invade other computers and perform acts
directed by its owner" originated in John Brunner's (1975) science fiction novel, The

Shockwave Riders, in 1975. In the computing community, the first worm programs were
implemented in the network of Alto workstations at the Xerox Palo Alto Research
Centre in the early 1980s (Shoch et al., 1982). Their authors, John Shoch and Jon Hupp,
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rewrites itself successively through the computer's memory until the computer is
exhausted and the system crashes. The worm also differs from the computer virus
in that it does not insert itself into other programs. It travels over network
connections to establish itself on other machines.
The Bacteria, or rabbits, are worms which cannot use networks to travel.
They do not alter existing code but reproduce until resources are exhausted. If a
system becomes clogged with a bacterium it should be closed down and restarted
from known 'clean' program sets. The most common form of this problem is
actually a bug which causes some program to self-propagate without limit.
A Trojan horse, like a virus, is a section of code embedded within a
legitimate application that performs operations unknown to and unwanted by the
user. It is a special case of a virus and possesses the same properties, except the
ability to replicate itself The unauthorized code may or may not direct the
legitimate program to cause damage to the system. The Trojan horse may be
activated immediately or may continue to operate as legitimate software for an
extended period oftime before activating itself (see logic bomb).
A logic bomb or a time bomb is a set of instructions that are executed in
conjunction with a predetermined event. The "trigger" is often a specific date or
time (e.g., April Fool's Day, Friday the 13th). The logic bomb has a legitimate use
in demonstration copies of software and as a form of copy protection. A virus or
Trojan horse may also contain a logic bomb.
The trapdoor, also known as the backdoor, is a section of code inserted
into a program which allows some particular security mechanism to be avoided,

intended them to replicate and locate idle workstations for temporary use as computer
servers; Shoch et al. saw that the worms could easily go out of control and disable the
workstations and the network. Their hopes for benign uses of worm programs were not
realised in the years following, as demonstrated in the Internet incident.
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thus allowing unauthorized or unmonitored access. It has a legitimate use in the
debugging of software. A virus or Trojan horse may implant a trapdoor in the
system.

1.1.3 A matter of definition
To define a computer virus in such simple terms as "a parasitic form of computer
code which has the particular characteristic of being able to reproduce itself'' ( alDossary, 1990, p. 131) is oversimplifying its attributes and "is not acceptable to the
computer community," in the words of Highland (1990, p. 1). To avoid this danger
this paper uses the following definitions. The reason for the inclusion of these
definitions is not to be comprehensive, but to emphasize that there is not one
definition of the term currently agreed upon.
A "computer virus" is a program that can "infect" other programs
by modifying them to include a possibly evolved version of itself
With this infection property, a virus can spread to the transitive
closure of information flow, corrupting the integrity of information
as it spreads . . . . Viruses can act as carriers of [any code the
attacker wishes to use] and thus can be used to cause arbitrary
[changes in programs and data.] They can carry other attacks along
with them, and thus by-pass many of the mechanisms that would
otherwise protect against these other attacks. (Cohen, 1984,

l 988)15

Virus: (1) A variation of Trojan horse. It is propagating (attaching
itself to files, programs) with a triggering mechanism (event, time)

15

Dr. Frederick B. Cohen, whose research in computer viruses was first published in 1984,
prepared this definition for the April 1988 issue of Computers & Security.
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with a mission (delete files, send data) .... (2) A section of code
introduced into a disk operating system for malicious purposes. At
some stage the inserted code will trigger a process that will
eliminate all files from the disk. The effects of the virus can extend
to many users. A disk containing the virus is loaded into a
computer, and it resides in cor:nputer memory. The virus detects
when a new disk is loaded into the system and then writes itself
onto that disk. (Longley & Shain, 1989, p. 360)

[A computer virus is] program code, usually attached to the
beginning or end of a program file, which contains the following:
(1)

A part which is responsible for self-replication, i.e., which
causes propagation of the virus by copying the entire virus
code (or a modified version thereof) to other program files
(or to some other region of a disk) at certain opportunities
(usually upon execution of the already-infected program or
execution of the to-be-infected program).

(2)

A part which performs some action (often a destructive
action on files or on entire disks) when a certain event takes
place (e.g., upon execution of an infected program on a
certain date or after the virus has replicated itself a certain
number of times). (Radai, 1989, p. 111)16

A true [computer] virus is a set of instructions, programmatic or
otherwise, that propagate themselves through computer systems
and/or networks, deliberately set to do things unwanted by the

16

Yisrael Radai prepared this definition for the April 1989 issue of Computers & Security.
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legitimate owners of those systems. Key to this definition is that
introduction of a virus as a deliberate act, not a technical
~alfunction, implying an actively hostile human intelligence behind
the virus. The harm viruses [could cause] may be no more than
denying use of a computer to its owners, or the complete and
irretrievable loss of data and software. The potential for damage
cannot be quantified, but it is unlimited in scope. (Ross, 1989)

The ability to replicate itself, the infection of other programs, the attachment to
another program, the idea of a carrier and the notion of performing an unexpected
function are the common functions included in these definitions.
The debate about the definition of a computer virus will probably continue.
It would be difficult to express the nature of this problem more eloquently than in
the words of Leiss (1990):
It should be kept in mind ... that this area of computer security is
still quite young; consequently there continue to be disagreements
among researchers about the precise delineation between certain
terms. (p. 29)
Dr. Harold Joseph Highland (1990, p. 27), founding editor and editor-in-chief of
the international professional journal, Computers & Security, adds further weight
to this argument by stating that currently it does not appear likely that computer
scientists will agree upon an "official" definition of the term.

1.1.4 History of computer viruses
There are some who claim that the idea of a computer virus was born in the earliest
days of the computer era. Elmer-DeWitt (1988, p. 65), for example, argues that it
was computer pioneer John von Neumann who laid out the basic blueprint of an
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electronic virus in a 1949 paper titled "Theory and organization of complicated
automata." There are others (e.g., Zajac, 1990, p. 25; Fitzgerald, 1989, p. 43;
Simons, 1989, p. 114) who consider computer viruses as the offspring of Frederick
B. Cohen. 17 Still other people (e.g., Adams, 1989, p. 3) maintain that computer
viruses have their origin in the "hacker" cultures of such premier American
technological universities as MIT, Carnegie-Mellon and California Institute of
Technology. 18

17

For his doctoral dissertation for the University of Southern California, Cohen (1986)
created a virus in an effort to find a way to defend against self-replicating programs.
Cohen (1984) first made his research public at the 1984 National Computer Security
Conference. He made his :findings known to an international audience during his
presentation that same year at the International Federation for Information Processing
Computer Security Conference (IFIP/Sec'84) in Toronto, Canada in September 1984. It
was established that a computer virus could infect some systems in a few minutes. A
massive new computer security issue was soon apparent.

18

In his Turing Award Lecture, Thompson (1984) discusses how computer science
students would amused themselves by inventing games that could reproduce an exact
copy of itself. One of these was a series of games called Core Wars (Dewdney, 1985;
1987; 1989) that involved programs that went to war against one another - the winner
being determined by the program that grew and outliving the others. What Thompson is
describing is a virus, a program that can effectively reproduce itself to include possibly
some evolved version of the original. To the dismay of his colleagues, Thompson (1984,
p. 761) not only revealed the existence of the computer viruses in the lecture, but went
on to show the audience how to make them: "If you have never done this, I urge you to
try it on your own." Elmer-DeWitt (1988, p. 64) maintains that the revelation was
further compounded by Dewney's landmark article in the May 1984 issue of Scientific
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Nevertheless, it appears (Spafford, Heaphy, & Ferbrache, 1989/1990, p.
318) that computer viruses were being written. by other individuals, although not
named as such, as early as 1981 on early Apple II PCs. Some early Apple II viruses
included the notorious Festering Hate, Cyberaids, and Elk Cloner strains.
Spafford et al. (1989/1990, p. 318) maintain that the Elk Cloner virus was first
reported in mid-1981.

1.1.5 The (In)famous "Trio"
It was not until the fall of 1987 that computer viruses began to command worldwide attention in the popular press as well as in the trade and technical press. Late
in 1987 computer viruses struck at two universities in the U.S. and one in Israel.
The Brain virus first appeared on the campus of the University of
Delaware in October 1987 (Webster, 1989). A few weeks later, the Lehigh virus

American, which described Core Ware and offered readers who sent U.S. $2 for postage
a copy for guide-lines for creating their own viral battlefields.
In March 1985, Scientific American published a letter in its Computer
Recreations section from two programmers that established a blueprint of a PC based
computer virus. According to Dewdney ( 1985), Roberto Cerruti and Mario Morocutti of
Brescia in Italy were inspired by the description of core wars:
Mario thought to write a program capable of passing from one
computer to the other like a virus, and 'infecting' in this way, other
Apples. But we were not able to conceive it until I realised that the
program had to infect floppy disks .... We decided that after 16 self
reproducing cycles, the program should decide to re-initialize the disk
immediately on bootstrap. Now, the awful evil of our idea was clear,
and we decided never to carry it out, nor to speak to anybody about the
idea. (p. 16)
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was discovered at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania (van Wyk, 1989). In
December, the Hebrew University at Jerusalem found itself attacked by a computer
virus (Radai, 1989). In order to discover how the virus works and precisely what it
does, a group of students in the Computer Science Department of the Hebrew
University disassembled the virus code and began to study it and found the
Jerusalem or Friday the 13th virus. 19

Since the outbreak of these three incidents, the media have run numerous
stories about break-ins, worms, and viruses and been somewhat sensationalised as
a consequence. 20 The number of incidents has been on the rise ever since. There is
a growing concern in the computer community about these forms of electronic

19

These three viruses can be broadly categorised into two different types. The Brain virus
was a boot sector infector. The Lehigh virus and the Jerusalem viruses were executable
program infectors. The former attached itself only to COMMAND.COM; the other two
viruses infected .EXE and/or .COM programs.
The three viruses also differed in the way the media is attacked. Aside from the

Lehigh virus that infected both floppy disks and hard disks, the others only infected
floppy disks. The Brain sometimes destroyed several sectors of a disk but often did little
more damage. The Lehigh virus, depending upon its host, would wipe out an entire disk
after a set number of DOS operations.
The Jerusalem viruses were replicators, causing an increase in the size of
program. Although most viruses will not reinfect a previously infected program, the
coding of one of the Jerusalem viruses was defected. It permitted the reinfection of an
infected program. Because of the viral infection some programs were unable to be
executed since there was insufficient memory. In other cases there was a substantial
increase in program execution time.
20

For example, it was argued (Highland, 1988; Simons, 1989, p. 115) that in a rush to get
stories into print some misinformation, unfortunately, were included.
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vandalism. This concern arises from the possible damage to stored information on
which the work depends and the ensuing disruption of the work-place. The danger
of attacks by computer viruses on computers, however, is not confined to
destruction or modification of data only, as shown in section 1.1.6.

1. 1. 6 Risks posed by viruses
The range of threats posed by viruses is limited only by the imagination and lack of
ethics of their creators. According to The Computer Virus Handbook (n. d.), a
guide written by Price Waterhouse professionals in the U.S. and U.K., some of the
risks posed by viruses include the following:

Loss of Life. In a real-time system ( e.g., airline traffic control system) the
attack of a computer virus can be life threatening. In the case of the
penetration of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Computer, the intruder
entered a computer used in real-time control of a medical experiment (Stoll,
1988). Had he not been detected in time, a patient might have been severely
injured or even killed.

Destruction or Modification of Data. In the first conviction for a virus
crime, a disgruntled employee at a Texas-based securities trading and
insurance firm planted a program that systematically deleted sales
commission records every month (Wong & Watt, 1990, p. 63; Wilding,
1990a, p. 4; Hafner, 1988, p. 50; Elmer-DeWitt, 1988, p. 63). In this
manner the logic bomb erased 168,000 client records. The company was
fortunate in that the crime was detected after only two days. Still, the
company had to spend considerable time, effort, and money rebuilding its
damaged database.
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Interruption of Operations. The most significant secondary effects of a

virus are those that involve lost productivity. Computer support personnel
will be involved with the tasks of recovering or recreating lost files,
programs, or data; removing the virus; diagnosing the problem; and
developing preventive measures. Management time may be required to reestablish the confidence of customers/shareholders and to formulate
procedures that will reduce the risk of future virus attack. Internal and
external auditors may have to demonstrate to the audit committee and
senior management that adequate audit procedures were used during the
examination.

Embarrassment. Attacks of computer viruses at universities have been

well documented (e.g, Grocott et al., 1990; White, 1989; Webster, 1989;
van Wyk, 1989; Radai, 1989; Monk, 1990). However, the private sector
has been reluctant to admit vulnerability to virus attacks due largely to their
fear of adverse publicity. Details of a successful virus attack, including the
losses suffered, could shake shareholder confidence in an organization's
management. Many corporations are unwilling to discuss the issue for fear
that any revelation might attract attention and provoke a future attack.

1.1. 7 The growth of the virus problem
The problem of computer viruses has grown to significant proportions in the last
few years ("News track", 1991, p. 9; Wilding, 1991a, p. 2), as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1, adapted from Fites et al. (1992, p. 53), shows that the number of new
IBM PC viruses is almost growing at an exponential rate from late 1986 to January
1991.
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Data gathered by Virus Bulletin, an authoritative international publication
on computer virus prevention, recognition and removal, also show a similar trend.

Virus Bulletin publishes an update of known IBM PC viruses reported to the
bulletin during the preceding month in each of its editions. In its first edition in July
1989, the bulletin listed only 14 virus patterns. Two years later, the bulletin lists a
total of374 known viruses affecting IBM PC, XT, AT, PS/2 and compatibles in its
July 1991 issue.21 (A listing of these 374 viruses is reproduced in this paper as
Appendix 1 to give the reader a general feel of the name and types of the 374
unique IBM PC viruses.)
The growth of the virus problem is not restricted to the IBM PC, and now
affects all popular personal computers including Macintosh, Apple II, Atari ST,
and Commodore Amiga. Mainframe viruses do exist for a variety of operating
systems and machines, "but all reported cases to date have been experimental in
nature, written by serious academic researchers in controlled environments"
(Spafford et al., 1989/1990, p. 319).
Most virus activity has involved PCs because of several factors, one of the
most important being the PC software (e.g. MS-DOS) does not contain user and
supervisor mode (Kamay et al., 1990, p. 16; Adams, 1989, p. 12). Thus any
knowledgeable person has access to operating system level commands. In a
Mainframe operating system, such access would be in privileged mode and
therefore unavailable to application programs and all except systems programmers.

21

However, it should be noted that there are conflicting reports on the number of known
viruses as of 1991 by various researchers. The number of virus samples gathered by
Virus Bulletin is chosen for its authoritativeness. The second paragraph of section 1.4

gives a brief discussion of the reason for the disparity in the number of viruses being
reported.
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1. 1. 8 Viruses in the Australian scene
Although the vandalism or purposeful abuse by introducing computer viruses or
worms to computer systems so far seems to be mainly an American experience, it
has become increasingly significant as a form of computer abuse in Australia in
recent years, as shown in Tables 1 & 2 on pages 31 and 32, respectively. In fact,
Tables 1 & 2 show that computer virus represents the fastest growing category of
abuse in terms of the frequency of occurrence during the period from February
1989 to May 1990 in Australia.
Tables 1 & 2, adapted from Kamay et al. (1989, 1990), have been updated
from computer abuse cases notified to and documented by the Australian
Computer Abuse Research Bureau (ACARB) during the period from February
1989 to May 1990. The ACARB's figures indicate that total number of computer
virus cases increased from 12 in the period ending January 1989 to 45 in the period
ending May 1990. From the 45 computer virus cases reported since 1989, the
average loss to the victims is $9,310 per crime. 22 The figures indicate that
computer viruses, as a type of computer abuse, represents 59% of the reported
case over the period from February 1989 to May 1990.
Although ACARB's figures do not necessarily show the complete extent of
computer abuse in Australia, it is important to note that the factual evidence that
exists in the profile supports the claim that computer virus, as a type of computer
abuse in Australia, is showing a gradual significance over this period of time.
Apart from ACARB's figures, there is minimal empirical research of a
similar nature being conducted to investigate computer viruses as a form of
computer abuse in Australia. This study was thus appropriate in that it provides
current evidence as to whether there is a problem in the work environment as

22

It should be noted that this average loss is based on a small sample of 2. The real figure
is likely to be much higher.
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opposed to the creation and isolation of computer viruses m laboratories of
computer science.

1.1.9 The present study
In the present study the extent to which the Western Australian environment is
being infected by IBM PC computer viruses was examined. In particular, the study
investigated the infection types and rates of IBM PC viruses in selected
government organizations in Western Australia.
Although the present study was designed to investigate the government
sector, it was designed to be sufficiently generalizable for use to investigate other
sectors as well (e.g., small business sector, large business sector). Some future
comparison study with other states and sectors would be a fruitful area for further
research. (See section 7 .2.1.)
The main reason why the present study focused on IBM PC computer
viruses (and not other PC or Mainframe viruses) is because the vast majority of
virus attacks reported to date have been against personal computers, with the
attacks on IBM PCs dominating. 23 In tum this is probably because the IBM style
PC is the most prolific PC throughout the world.
In addition, the present study aimed to test Spafford's (1990) speculation24
that "less than 10 viruses account for 90% of infections." Since this study adopted

23

Baker (1991, p. 31) argues that more than 70% of all reported infections have involved
IBM PCs and compatibles although he gives no information on how the data are
gathered.

24

In his Computer viruses: Presentation for technology training corporation, Spafford
(1990, p. 5) states that "less than 10 viruses account for 90% of infections." We have no
information on how the data are gathered, although others (e.g., Borrett, 1990, p. 38)
have presented similar observations. This paper treats Spafford's observation as a
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the view that currently there exists a nnrumum of 374 viruses, Spafford's
speculation really means that a very small amount of viruses actually account for a
large percentage of the infections.

1.2 Purpose of the Study
The present study was descriptive (Isaac & Michael, 1981, p. 46; McMillan et al.,
1989, p. 33) in nature in that a fact-finding survey based on questionnaires and
standardized interviews was conducted in selected government organizations in
Western Australia in order to obtain data on which the research findings can be
based.
The data gathering instrument for the present study was a standardized
questionnaire which, in large part, comprises limited choice questions directed at
obtaining such information as infection rates of various types of computer viruses.
The questionnaire was chosen as the data gathering instrument because it is
relatively economical, has standardized questions, and questions can be tailored for
specific purposes of the study (McMillan et al., 1989, p. 254; Isaac et al., 1981, p.
130).

To ensure correct interpretation of the questions - so that the potential for
subjectivity and bias can be reduced - and encourage a high response rate the
standardized questionnaire was administered by interview. If necessary, responses
were probed, followed up, clarified, and elaborated during the interview in order to
achieve specific, accurate responses (McMillan et al., 1989, p. 266).

speculation rather than a hypothesis because it does not meet the hypothesis criteria, as
suggested by McMillan and Schumacher (1989, p. 90 ff.) and Tm;:kman (1988, p. 62).
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The purpose of the study was:
•

To collect detailed factual information of the Western Australian
environment that describes existing phenomena (e.g., Is a given
population being infected by IBM PC viruses? If yes, what type of
virus is infecting the given population and what is the rate of
infection of that particular virus for the given population? Does
reinfection occur? Which categories does the virus fall into?);

•

To test the validity of Spafford's speculation within the Western
Australian environment (i.e. Is it true that less than 10 viruses
account for 90% of infections in Western Australia?);

•

To identify problems (e.g. How is the virus introduced? Who is the
perpetrator?);

•

To determine what other people are doing with similar problems or
situations and benefit from their experience in making future plans
and decisions; and

•

To help determine that the problem a given population is facing is
definitely caused by a virus.

1.3 Statement of Research Questions

It was the purpose of this study to investigate the infection types and rates of IBM
PC viruses in selected government organizations of Western Australia. In addition,
the present study aimed at testing the validity of Spafford's speculation that less
than 10 viruses (out of a minimum of374) account for 90% of all infections.
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1.3.1 Subsidiary questions
1. Does reinfection of systems occur? If yes, what is the reinfection rate?
2. Which categories does the virus fall into? (i.e., is it a boot infector, system
infector, application infector for PC, etc.?)
3. How is the virus introduced? Who is the perpetrator?

1.3.2 Terms
Infection types. The type of a computer virus. For example, is the virus a
boot sector infector, a COM files infector, or is of any other types?
Infection rates. The rate of infection of a particular type of computer
virus. For example, the infection rate of boot sector infector viruses is, say,
10%.
IBM PC. The term "IBM PC" is used here to include the IBM XT, AT,
PS/2 and compatibles.
Virus. The term "virus" ts used here synonymously with the term
"computer virus." See section 1.1.3 for a definition of a computer virus.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The research is significant in that it focussed attention on the problem of definition
and then identification of a computer virus. As noted earlier, there is no general
agreement in the computer community on the definition of a computer virus. Thus,
gathering and analyzing data on computer viruses is complicated by the fact that
the definitions used by the various entities involved are ambiguous and vary widely
in their specifications.
Secondly, confusion abounds in reporting regarding the number of known
computer viruses. There are viruses and there are often "mutations" of these
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viruses. The many ways in which a researcher can classify these mutations is the
main reason for the disparity in the number of viruses being reported. 25 Also, there
appears to be competition among some of the researchers working in the computer
virus field to announce a greater number of known viruses than anyone else. 26
Thus, gathering and analyzing data on computer viruses can be complicating in that
given any two viruses, one cannot always be assured that they are not the same. To
resolve this problem, this study adopted the number of virus samples gathered by

Virus Bulletin and used that classification system (see Appendix 1). In essence, this
study recognized that currently there exists a minimum of 374 distinctly different
viruses affecting IBM PC, XT, AT, PS/2 and compatibles.
Thirdly, it seems evident ("News track", 1991, p. 9; Wilding, 1991a, p. 2;
Fites et al., 1992, p. 53) that the incidence of real world computer virus infections
is increasing at an alarming rate. The growth of this problem is of limited interest if
the viruses are quarantined in laboratories and unless the samples listed manifest

25

For example, one attribute of the Brain virus is to write "Brain" as the label on an
infected disk. If another virus is found that writes "Hello" as the disk label but is
identical in every other respect, does one count this as a new virus? The code of both are
the same but only five ASCII characters have been changed. Some researchers have
taken an easy way out. If there is any change in the critical code of a virus, no matter
how slight, they count it as a new virus. Others feel that so long as any two viruses have
identical code and do not behave differently, they are variants of the original virus.
Depending upon what one chooses to recognize as separate viruses the total
number of separately identifiable IBM PC viruses is somewhere between 800 and 1300
as of March 1992.

26

This phenomenon is perhaps exacerbated by the myopic view that "the more computer
viruses one can list, the greater an authority he [or she] is on the subject" (Highland,
1990, p. 29).
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themselves in the real world there is no real problem. Unfortunately, according to
Wilding (1991a, p. 2), the editor of Virus Bulletin, "this is exactly what is
happening, with more and more different specimens being encountered." Again,
gathering and analyzing data on computer viruses is further complicated by the fact
that the number of computer viruses are increasing at a dramatic rate.
Fourthly, there is no specific study similar to the nature of the present study
being conducted in Australia in general, and in Western Australia in particular. As a
result, there is very limited existing data to extrapolate and build upon. The present
study is thus significant in that factual information regarding the nature and
prevalence of the IBM PC viruses problem in the Western Australia environment
can be added.
In addition, an attempt has been made to link this research with Spafford's
(1990) speculation so that at the end of the study, the validity of Spafford's
speculation within the Western Australian environment could be verified.

1.5 Organization of the Thesis

Chapter One of this thesis gives a brief introduction to the nature of the present
study and deals with the technical preliminaries of this study. This chapter will
familiarize the reader with basic terminology and fundamental issues address in the
present study.
Chapter Two deals with the review of relevant research and literature. This
chapter contains a review of general literature on computer viruses, specific studies
similar to the present study, and the research design of the present study.
Chapter Three provides the theoretical framework of this study: what are
the variables impacting on the research questions? What are the assumptions
underpinning this study?
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Chapter Four describes the method of investigation for this study. This
chapter contains a brief description of: the research design for this study, the
instruments used, the population of this study, the ethical considerations for this
study, the data analysis procedures, and the limitations of this study.
Chapter Five presents the results of the survey conducted for this study. It
is divided into four sections to cover the organizational profile, the use of IBM PC
in the organizations surveyed, IBM PC viruses past experience in the
organizations, and the .IBM PC virus control mechanisms and procedures in place
in the organizations surveyed.
Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of the implications of the results
gathered from the survey.
Chapter Seven gives a brief summary of the findings of the survey
conducted for this study, provides suggestions for further research on this area of
study, and concludes the thesis.
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Chapter Two
Review of Literature

2.1 General Literature on Computer Viruses

There have been many newspaper and trade press articles about computer viruses although often misleading and inaccurate (Highland, 1988a; Simons, 1989, p. 105)
- but there has been little technical material published except in Virus Bulletin and
Compu.ters & Security. 21 The nature of computer security is such that published

material tends to be quite limited.

2.1.1 Conceptual foundations and defence
The following are important technical research papers regarding the conceptual
foundations of computer viruses, design of virus defences, and the spread of
computer viruses:
•

Dr.

Frederick

Cohen's

(1984)

"Computer

viruses:

Theory

and

experiments," presented at 1FIP/Sec'84 in Toronto, Canada in September

27

This is a leading international journal addressing security issues, audit control, and data
integrity relating to all

data processing

equipment:

mainframe,

mini

and
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features, and summaries of articles published elsewhere.
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1984; and his subsequent ( 1986) doctoral dissertation. 28 A generic example
(i.e., template) for a virus, formulated in pseudo-Pascal and adapted from
the one given by Cohen (1984), is given by Leiss (1990, p. 39).
•

Rudiger Dierstein's (1987) "Computer viruses: A secret threat," presented
at SECURICOM held in Paris, France during March 1986. This article
provides an insight into the structure, propagation and function of
computer viruses, and explores the systems environment in which viruses
are created and proliferate.

•

Dr. Ian H. Witten's (1987) "Computer (ln)security: Infiltrating open
systems," that appeared in the summer 1987 issue of Abacus. In this article,
Witten describes an impressive array of methods both for securing and for
attacking computers. The article also explains how viruses and worms
work, and how they can be created.

•

Dr. Winfried Gleissner's (1989) "A mathematical theory for the spread of
computer viruses" that appeared in Computers & Security. This article
introduces a model to treat the spread of computer viruses mathematically.

Two additional articles about computer viruses appeared during the summer of
1987, according to Highland (1990, p. 295). They were "Taxonomy of computer
virus defence mechanisms" by Catherine L. Young and "Computer viruses: Myth
or reality?" by Howard Israel. Both were in the Proceedings of the 10th National
Computer Security Conference that was held in September 1987.

28

Cohen, generally regarded as the "father" of computer viruses, published much of the
original work on computer viruses starting in 1983, which was mostly theoretical and
highly mathematical based.
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2.1.2 Prevention
Prevention refers to the ability to ensure that an uninfected system remains
uninfected. Cohen (1984) gives a discussion of flow controls as a means of
guarding against computer viruses. Some approaches based on the imperviousness
of hardware to remote manipulation are given by Routh (1984) and Davis &
Gantenbein (1987). Other papers of interest are provided by Highland (1988b,
1988c, 1988d), Fak (1988), Pozzo & Gray (1987), Wiseman, (1989), Zajac,
(1990), Murray (1988) and Cohen (1987, 1988, 1989, 1990).

2.2 Specific Studies Similar to the Current Study

There is no doubt that there is a real threat of computer viruses but there is a
dearth of information regarding the prevalence and the types of different viruses.
Data exists in the U.S. in some states and periodic data comes from the U.K. but
there is limited systematic data from Australia, apart from ACARB's periodic
profile of computer abuse in Australia, which categorizes computer viruses as one
of many forms of computer abuse.

2.2.1 ACARB's 1990 profile of computer abuse in Australia
As a non-profit public organization, ACARB sees itself in an ideal position to serve
the business community "as a catalyst in the synthesis of knowledge in the
[computer abuse] area, as a researcher in the evaluation and development of
preventative means, and as a forum for the exchange of ideas. "29 (Kamay et al.,
1990, p. 29).

29

ACARB regularly publishes a profile of the extent and nature of computer abuse in
Australia in which factual information is gathered in an attempt to quantify this
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2.2.1.1 Summary of ACARB's 1990 Figures
The following tables, adapted from Kamay et al. (1989, 1990) and Bright (1989),
have been updated from cases notified to, and documented by, ACARB during the
period from February 1989 to May 1990. The tables provided are of two types~
viz., the period to date figures that represent the details of cases notified to
ACARB from February 1989 to May 1990, and figures that update the total
number and values of cases notified to AC ARB ( and prior to its formation CITCARB at the Caulfied Institute of Technology) since 1978.

Table 1

Type of Computer Abuse in Australia (February 1989 to May 1990)
Classification

Count

Known

$ Value of

Value

Loss

Percent of
Value

Average
$ Loss

Computer Related Fraud

2

2

1,oso,000

64.30

Unauthorised Use
Hacking

2

0

0

525,000

3

1

5,000

0.01

5,000

1

1

0

14

14

527,776

32. 40

37,698

2

32,500
17,920

2.00

32,500
17,920

$1,633,196

0

Theft of Output
Sabotage
Masterfile Destroyed
Theft of Equipment
Electronic Funds
Virus

33

1
1

Total

57

20

0

1.10
100.00%

$81,660

phenomenon, determine any trends in its development and thereby provide a
biographical sketch or profile of computer abuse in Australia.
ACARB also publishes a regular Newsletter/Research Report (the ACARB
Newsletter and the ACARB Research Report) which includes papers of interest and

periodic statistical profiles of computer abuse in Australia in order to enable business to
understand trends that are occurring. In addition, ACARB produces the Computer Risks
Update which compiles material on current and potential risks, descriptions of viruses

and other forms of attack, potential remedies, brief details of new books and other
publication, new anti-viral and other security products and so forth.
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Table 2
Type of Computer Abuse in Australia (as of May 1990)
Classification

Count

Known

$

Value

Loss

Value of

Percent of

Average

Value

$ Loss

Computer Related Fraud

92

63

12,052,034

79. 2

191,302

Unauthorised Use

52

17

57,600

o.o

3,388

Hacking

29

4

18,3GO

0.0

4,575

Theft of Output

17

4

250,000

1.6

62,500

Sabotage

13

4

903,000

5.9

225,750

4

2

900

o.o

450

Theft of Equipment

48

44

1,247,976

8.2

28,363

Masterfile Destroyed
Electronic Funds

13

11

664,625

4. 4

60,420

Virus

45

2

18,620

o.o

9,310

Total

313

151

$15,213,055

100.0%

$100,749

Table 2 shows that the total number of cases reported by ACARB to date is
313, resulting in a loss of $15,213,055 from 151 assessable cases. 162 cases were
unassessable with an unknown loss. The average loss from the 151 assessable cases
was $100,749.
Incidentally, Table 1 shows that the greatest number of reported cases over
the period from February 1989 to May 1990 has involved the category of viruses.
This category represents 59% of the reported cases in the period.

2.2.1.2 Types of Abuse
Tables 1 and 2 categorise computer abuse by type according to nine categories;
viz., computer related fraud, unauthorised used, hacking, theft of output, sabotage,
masterfile destroyed, electronic funds transfer, computer virus, and theft of
equipment. The meanings of the heading in Tables 1 and 2 is as follows:
Count. Total number of incidences reported.
Known value. Total number of incidences with a known dollar loss.
Value of Loss. Total value ofloss for that category.
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Percent of Value. The percentage of that category against the total of all

categories.

Figure 2 on page 35 shows the percentage of various types of abuse, by number of
occurrences over the twelve year period (1978 - 1990) of data collection. Figure 3
on page 36 reflects the continued and stable growth of the nine categories of
computer abuse over the past two years. Although ACARB's figures do not
necessarily show the complete extent of computer abuse in Australia, it is
important to note that the factual evidence that exists in the profile shows stable
trends over this period of time.

2.2.1.3 Computer Viruses As Computer Abuse
Computer viruses are a form of computer abuse that is arguably more insidious
than any other, and represents the fastest growing category of abuse in terms of the
frequency of occurrence over the past two years in Australia. It amounts to 59% of
the cases of computer abuse in the current period. While it amounts to only 1% of
the monetary losses from computer abuse, 30 the cost of this activity may lie more
with the value an organization places on data and information that may be lost on
floppy and hard disk, and any subsequent loss of business opportunities and
productivity. Such factors are additional to the cost of time that is often required
for technicians to recover information or rebuild a hard disk. Hence, it is hard to
quantify the value of losses associated with viruses.
It is evident (Kamay et al., 1990, p. 16) from the documented cases by

ACARB of known viruses that they utilise relatively few methods of operation with
the most likely outcome being the destruction of information on a floppy or hard

30

It should be noted that the 1% is based on a small sample of 1 (see Table 1) and is
therefore not a good indicator of cost.

33

LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992

Honours Thesis

disk. A notable change in the character of viruses has occurred over the period
from February 1989 to May 1990, as Kamay et al. (1990, p. 16) observed, "has
been their increasing level of sophistication which has led to greater difficulty in
their detection and removal, and their greater virulence and destructive impact."
This observation is in general agreement with Wilding's (1991a~ p. 2) findings.

34
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2.2.2 Dataquest's 1991 computer virus market survey
One of the most revealing sessions of the 1991 NCSA (National Computer
Security Association) Anti-Virus Product Developers Conference in Washington,
D.C. was the publication of a Computer Virus Market Survey undertaken by
Dataquest (Hruska, 1992; Monk, 1992). The survey aims to identify the nature and

the extent of computer virus problem on PCs in the U.S. During October 1991,
602 corporate end-users were interviewed by telephone during October 1991. All
interviews were conducted on sites with 300 or more PCs and the majority of
respondents were responsible for controlling the virus problem on all the PCs. The
findings of the survey, adapted from Hruska ( 1992, p. 7) and Monk ( 1992, p. 5),
are summarized below:
•

63% of respondents reported at least one encounter with a virus over the
past year, and 9% had more than 25 PCs infected in the process;

•

New Zealand (or Stoned or Marijuana) was responsible for 48% of the

attacks, Jerusalem (or Friday the 13th) for 37% and Joshi for 8%;
•

The major entry points of viruses into the organizations surveyed were
disks brought from home PCs (43%), followed by the virus-infected
programs pulled down from bulletin boards (7%) and demonstration disks
and service engineers (6%). Only 1% of infections came with the PC from
the dealer or the factory;

•

When asked to estimate the cost of each virus infection, 3 1% of
organizations spent less than $2,000, 29% between $2,000 and $10,000,
while 7% spent more than a staggering $100,000.

A comparison between the findings ofDataquest's 1991 survey in the U.S. and the
findings of this study is provided in section 6.3.S of this paper.
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2.2.3 Virus Bulletin's February 1992 virus prevalence table
A Virus Prevalence Table, produced from statistics collated by Virus Bulletin, is
featured in each edition of the bulletin showing the prevalence of different viruses
in the U.K. during the preceding month.
The following Virus Prevalence Table, adapted from Wildin~ (1992, p. 6),
shows recorded virus infections reported to Virus Bulletin in the U.K. during
February 1992. However, it should be noted that Wilding (1991) maintains that:
the figures shown in these tables do not accurately portray the full
extent of the problem in the U.K. as they do not include statistics
from the myriad of other agencies involved in combating computer
viruses. (p. 4)

Table 3
Virus Bulletin's February 1992 Virus Prevalence Table
Virus

Incidents

Total Reports

New Zealand II

11

Form

11

20.3%

7

12. 9%

Michelangelo

4

7.4%

Spanish Telecom

3

5.5%

Cascade

2

3.7%

Vacsina

2

3. 7%

Maltese Amoeba

2

3. 7%

Flip

2

3. 7%

Brain

2

3.7%

1575

1

1. 8%

DIR II

1

1. 8%

Liberty

1

1. 8%

Anticad 2576

1

1. 8%

Joshi

1

1. 8%

Total

54

100%

Tequila
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2.3 Literature on Methodology

The present study was descriptive in nature in that a survey based on
questionnaires and interviews was conducted. The literature of surveys design and
techniques (Fink & Kosecoff, 1985; Fowler, 1984; Isaac et al., 1981; Borg & Gall,
1979; Campbell & Katona, 1953), of questionnaire design (Borg, 1963;
Oppenheim, 1966), and of interview techniques (Borg, 1963; Kerlinger, 1973)
were therefore expected to be relevant.
Research papers of interest and periodic statistical profiles of computer
abuse in Australia that ACARB publishes regularly was also consulted as
appropriate during the design of the questionnaire.
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Chapter Three
Theoretical Framework

3.1 Variables Impacting on the Research Questions

Since the research was descriptive in nature, no "independent", "dependent"
variable need be identified because "[descriptive research] does not involve
manipulation of independent variables" (McMillan et al., 1989, p. 282). The
purpose and the logic of this study determined that there was only one variable of
interest to the present study; viz., the infection rates and types of different IBM PC
viruses. All of the state government organizations of Western Australia comprised
the designated population of the study. (See Appendix 6 for a list of the surveyed
organizations.)
The 374 known IBM PC viruses (as of July 1991) gathered by the Virus

Bulletin (Wilding, 1991b) are categorised into the following seven types:
•

The COM files infector;

•

The EXE files infector;

•

The DOS boot sector31 infector;

•

The master boot sector3 2 infector;

•

Not memory-resident after infection virus;

31

This is logical sector O in each DOS partition.

32

This is the sector stored at absolute track 0, head 0, sector 1.
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•

Memory-resident33 after infection virus; and

•

Companion virus. 34

A somewhat similar classification method is provided in Virus Characteristics List

V89B, a software documentation that comes with the 1992 version of McAfee
Associates' antiviral software, VIRUSCAN Version 8.4B89 (1992). All unique IBM
PC viruses are categorised into the following ten types:

33

•

Virus uses Stealth Techniques;

•

Virus uses self-encryption;

•

Virus installs itselfin memory (i.e., memory-resident);

•

Virus infects COMMAND.COM;

•

Virus infects COM files;

•

Virus infects EXE files;

•

Virus infects Overlay files;

•

Virus infects floppy diskette boot;

•

Virus infects fixed disk boot sector; and

•

Virus infects fixed disk partition table. 35

This implies that, once a single infected program has been run, the virus potentially can
spread to any or all programs in the system. This spreading occurs during the entire
work session (until the system is rebooted to clear the virus from memory), rather than
during a small period of time when the infected program is executing viral code.

34

The term "companion virus" describes any computer virus which locates an EXE file
and then creates a new program in the same directory with a COM extension (Wilding,
1990b, p. 3). This bogus COM file contains the virus code and is invoked before the
legitimate EXE file executes.

3

s

Fixed (or hard) disk partition table (or record) (aka master boot record) is the 64-byte
table contained at the end of the master boot sector.
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For the present study, it was determined that the classification method used by
VIRUSCAN Version 8.4B89 (1992) is more appropriate since it covered a wider
range and is somewhat more updated. Thus, all unique IBM PC viruses that are
known to infect the responding organizations would be categorised into the 10
infection types advocated by VIRUSCAN Version 8.4B89 (1992).

3.2 Assumptions Underpinning the Study

The present study assumed that:
1.

IBM PC viruses do exist and pose a form of computer abuse in the Western
Australian environment.

2.

information about IBM PC viruses within selected organizations can be
obtained during the interview.

3.

the respondents realise that the problem of IBM PC virus infection does
exist in their respective organizations and recognise the types of infecting
viruses.

4.

the respondents have reliable information with regards to

their

organization's IBM PC viruses infection rates.
5.

no one guesses or presents an uninformed answer when answering the
questionnaire during the interview.

6.

the respondents will be cooperative and that they will produce unbiased and
truthful responses during the interview.
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Chapter Four
Method of Investigation

4.1 Design of the Study

As stated, the research was descriptive in nature in that a survey based on

questionnaires and interviews was conducted for the study. The study was initiated
with the view that it will stand or fall on the extent to which it can add
convincingly to knowledge about the present status of the IBM PC viruses problem
in the Western Australian environment. In addition, the study has made an attempt
to investigate Spafford's speculation within the Western Australian environment.

4.2 Description of Instruments Used

Data on which the research findings will be based were obtained from a survey of
selected state government organizations. The data gathering instrument was a
locally developed questionnaire which, in large part, comprises limited choice
questions directed at obtaining such information as type of virus and infection
rates. (The questionnaire is appended as Appendix 2). The questionnaire was
standardized so that information from each respondent is gathered in the same
manner. The standardized questionnaire was used by the interviewer as a basis for
the interview so that the potential for subjectivity and bias can be reduced. The

43

LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992

Honours Thesis

participants were assisted by the interviewer in identifying the types of infecting
viruses when the need arise.
As with other descriptive research, there is no assurance that all questions
in the questionnaire will be understood. In the present study, this problem was
recognised and to this end it was intended that the questionnaire was carefully field
tested to eliminate ambiguous or biased items and to improve format, both for ease
of understanding and facility in analyzing results. Furthermore, any inquiries the
respondents might have regarding the questionnaire during the interview have been
answered by the interviewer.

4.3 Population of the Study

Before the commencement of the study, the official list of the address of all the
state government organizations and the name of a contact person was sought from
State I. T. Division, Department of State Services. Since the population of the
study was not sufficiently large (n = 48), a letter of transmittal was sent to all of
the 48 prospective participants to request their participations in the survey. (A
sample letter of transmittal is included in Appendix 3.) Confirmation of
participation was sought through telephone calls.

4.4 Survey Response Rate

A very high response rate (87.5%, n = 42) for the study has been achieved. This is
taken as an assurance that adequate representation of the state government sector
for the study is achieved and that the survey results is truly representative of the
state government sector. (See Appendix 6 for a list of the organizations.)
Of the six (12.5%) organizations that refused to participate in the study:
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3 ( 50%) of them declined to give any reason of their refusal to
participate;

•

2 (33.33%) of them said they were too busy with their work to be
able to participate; and

•

1 (16.67%) of them cited the organization has a written policy
never to participate in any study of this nature.

4.5 Ethical Considerations

Prior to commencement of the study, approval was sought from the University
Committee for the Conduct of Ethical Research since the study involves human
subjects. (The approval letter is included in Appendix 4.)
Participation in the study was entirely voluntary and subjects were free to
withdraw their consent at any stage of the study. During the interview, subjects
were informed of the purpose of the study, that there will be no compulsion to
participate in the study and that they will be free to withdraw from further
participation in the study at any time.
In keeping with the policies of the university's Committee for the Conduct
of Ethical Research, a copy of the Form of Disclosure and Informed Consent was
made available to participants for their records. (The written statement is included
in Appendix 5.)
Although number identification on the questionnaires was used to allow
easy recording of data, participants were not identified by name. Completed
questionnaires were seen only by this researcher, usef for the purpose of this study
only and were destroyed at the end of the study.
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4.6 Data Analysis Procedures

When the data on which the research findings will be based were gathered from the
survey, the infection rate of each of the individual infecting viruses were then
tabulated. Once the infection rate of each of the infecting viruses was tabulated, it
was relatively easy to validate whether Spafford's speculation that less than 10
viruses account for 90% of infections was applicable in this environment. The
reinfection rate of the infecting viruses were then determined from the available
data gathered from the survey.

4. 7 Limitations of the Study

Isaac ( 1981) argues that, with the exception of surveys based on a search of
records:
surveys are dependent on direct communication with persons having
characteristics, behaviours, attitudes, and other relevant information
appropriate for a specific investigation. (p. 128)
This, Isaac (1981, p. 128) contends, "make them reactive in nature; i.e., they
directly involve the respondent in the assessment process by eliciting a reaction." It
should be noted that reactive methods run many risks of generating misleading
information although they are often the most cost-effective, efficient, and credible
means of collecting data. These risks, adapted from Isaac ( 1981 ), include:
•

Surveys only tap respondents who are accessible and cooperative;

•

Surveys often make the respondent feel special or unnatural and
thus produce responses that are artificial or slanted;

•

Surveys arouse "response sets" such as acquiescence or a proneness
to agree with positive statements or questions;
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•

Surveys are vulnerable to over-rater or under-rater bias - the
tendency for some respondents to give consistently high or low
ratings; and

•

In the case of interviews, biased reactions can be elicited because of
the characteristics of the interviewer or respondent, or the
combination, that elicit an unduly favourable or unfavourable
pattern of responses (p. 128).

The present study is thus delimited by these risks.
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Chapter Five
Results of the Survey

5.1 Organization Profiles

The first section of the questionnaire was designed to obtain information regarding
the number of PC users, the volume and the size of each organization surveyed.

5. 1.1 Industrial groupings
In terms of industrial groupings, all the respondents of the survey were from W.A.
State Government departments and organizations. The high response rate (87.5%,

n = 42) for the survey assures reasonble representation.

5.1.2 Size of the organizations
It is difficult to determine the size and in turn the computer activity in a particular
organization and one of the criteria used was to examine the expenditure of the
organization. The size of the organizations in terms of gross annual budget in $A is
set out in Table 4.
Table 4 reveals that half of the organizations (50%) have a budget of under
$100 million. In terms of gross annual budget, the organizations have an average of
$121.08 million with a standard deviation (S.D.) of $244.51 million. However, it
should be noted that one organization has a very large budget ( over $1000
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million). If this organization were excluded from the calculation, the average gross
annual budget of the organizations will be $81.12 million, with a S.D. of $125.12
million. These figures, ignoring the exceptional case, are believed to be more
representative.
Table 4 also shows that a significant number, approximately one third
(33.33%) of the respondents could not, or chose not, to answer this question. This
can be attributed to the fact that many respondents of the survey are technical
personnel who can answer questions pertinent to the virus infection in their
respective organizations but who may not have the necessary information regarding
the financial status of their organizations.

Table 4
Size of Organizations In Terms of Gross Annual Budget
Budget

Number of

($ Millions)

Respondents

Percentage

Not Available

14

33.33

Under 50

17

40.48

51 - 100

4

9.52

101 - 200

2

4.76
2.38

201 - 300

1

301 - 400

2

4.76

401 - 500

1

2.38

Over 1000

1

2.38

42

100.00

Total
Mean= $121.08 million
Standard Deviation= $244.51 million

5.1.3 Number of staff
Another indicator of size of the organization is the number of staff employed which
also represents an indication of the likely computer activity. The number of
full-time staff in each organization is shown in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that the majority of the organizations (52.38%) employed
between 51 and 300 employees. The average number of staff in the organizations is
839 (round off to the next digit).
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Table 5
Number of Staff in the Organizations
Number of

Staff

Respondents
2.38

Not Available

1

Under 50

2

4.76

8

19.05

51 -

100

101 -

200

9

21. 43

-

300

5

11. 90

301 -

400

1

2.38

4 01 -

500

2

4.76

501 -

750

3

7.14

751 - 1000

4
7

16.67

42

100.00

201

Over 1000

Mean= 838.22

Percentage

Number of

= 839

Standard Deviation= 1357.93

9.52

= 1358

5.1.4 Computing (or computer services or IT) section
A separate computing (or computer services or IT) section is maintained m 38
(90.48%) of the 42 organizations. The size of computing sections in terms of
staffing is set out in Table 6. The majority of the organizations (66.67%) employed
between 1 and 30 staff in their respective computing sections. On average, the
number of staff employed in each computing section is 25.
Table 6
Number of Staff in Computing Section of the Organizations
Number of

Number of

Staff

Respondents

1
11

21
31
41
51
61
71

81
91

Mean= 24.34

-

Percentage
57. 8 9

10

22

20

2

5.26

30

4

10.53

40

1

2.63

50

1

2.63

60

2

5.26

70

3

7.89

80

1

2.63

90

1

2.63

100

1

2.63

38

100.00

= 25

Standard Deviation= 28.19

= 29
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5.2 Profile of the IBM PC Use

To understand the computer virus infection incidents it was necessary to obtain
information regarding the profile of PC use within an organisation. Such relevant
information would include the number of PCs in use and the number of users. It is
also to determine whether the systems are nertworked or operated on a standalone
basis.

5.2.1 Number of IBM PC
The number of IBM PC each of the organizations possessed is listed in Table 7,
which shows that the majority of them (59.52%) have between 1 and 100 PCs. On
average, the number of IBM PC each organization owns is 170 with a S.D. of 208.
The large standard deviation can be attributed to the fact that the data are
"positively skewed" (i.e., organizations tend to have small number of PCs) and not
spread in a normal distribution.
Table 7
Number of IBM PC in the Organizations
Number of

Number of

IBM PC

Respondents

1 -

25

50
25 51 - 100

Mean= 169.57

Percentage
23.81

10
7

16.67

8

19.05

101 - 150

4

9.52

151 - 200

3

7.14

201 - 300

2

4.76

301 - 400

1

401 - 500

2

2.38
4.76

Over 500

5

11. 90

42

100.00

= 170

Standard Deviation= 207.51

= 208
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5.2.2 Number ofApple Macintosh
Although this survey was not examining computer viruses associated with Apple
Macintosh PCs it was considered worthwhile to gain an understanding of the
penetration of Apple Macintosh computers compared to IBM PCs in this particular
environment to consider whether research into Apple Macintosh viruses could be
justified.
As it transpired, 24 (57.14%) of the 42 surveyed organizations own one or
more Apple Macintosh computers. For those organizations that possess at least
one Apple Macintosh, the number of Apple Macintosh each of them owned is set
out in Table 8.
The majority of the organizations (54.17%) have between 1 and 5 Apple
Macintoshs computers. On average, the number of Apple Macintosh computers the
organizations own is 59. However, it should be noted that there is an organization
which has a very large number of Apple Macintosh (approximately 1000). If this
organization were excluded from the calculation, the number of Apple Macintosh
in each organization, on average, will be 18, with a S.D. of 37. These figures are
believed to be more reflective of the existing situation.

Table 8

Number of Apple Macintosh in the Organizations
Number of

Number of

Apple Macintosh

Respondents

-

5

13

54.17

6 -

10

3

12.50

-

15

3

12.50

16 -

20

1

4.17

-

25

0

26 -

50

1

0.00
4.17

1
11

21

51 - 100
Over 100

Mean= 58.21

Percentage

= 59

Standard Deviation= 203.68

= 204
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5.2.3 Number of IBM PC users
The number of staff that are IBM PC users on a regular basis in the organizations
is shown in Table 9. The majority of the organizations (54.76%) have between 1
and 100 staff that are regular IBM PC users. On average, the number of staff that
are regular IBM PC users in the organizations is 215.

Table 9

Number of Staff That Use IBM PC Regularly In the Organizations
Number of

Number of

IBM PC User

Respondents

1 25 -

Mean= 214.19

Percentage

25

10

23.81

50

5

11. 90

51 - 100

8

19.05

101 - 150

4

9.52

151 - 200

2

4. 76

201 - 300

2

4.76

301 - 400

3

7.14

401 - 500

2

4. 7 6

Over 500

6

14.29

42

100.00

= 215

Standard Deviation= 276.40

= 277

'

~: I

5.2.4 Number of Apple Macintosh users
Twenty two (52.38%) of the 42 surveyed organizations have one or more staff that
are regular Apple Macintosh users. For those organizations that possess at least
one Apple Macintosh, the number of staff that are regular Apple Macintosh users is
set out in Table 10. The majority of the organizations (72.73%) have between 1
and 15 staff that are regular Apple Macintosh users. On average, the number of
staff that are regular Apple Macintosh users in the organizations is 75. However, it
should be noted that there is an organization which has a very large number of staff
that are regular Apple Macintosh user (approximately 1200). If this organization
were excluded from the calculation, the number of staff that are regular Apple
Macintosh users in the organizations, on average, will be 22, with a S.D. of 38.
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Table 10

Number of Staff That Use Apple Macintosh Regularly In the Organizations
Number of Apple
Macintosh User

Respondents

1 -

5

7

6 -

10

5

22.73

11 -

15

4

18.18

16 -

20

2

9.09

21 -

25

0

0.00

26 -

50

1

4.55

51 - 100

1

4.55

2

9.09

22

100.00

Over 100

Mean= 74.64

Percentage

Number of

= 75

Standard Deviation= 253.94

31.82

= 254

5.2.5 Time/or which the organiza.tions have been using IBM PC
The length of time for which the organizations have been using IBM PCs 1s
summarised in Table 11, which shows that the majority of the organizations have
been using IBM PCs for between 6 and 8 years.
Table 11

Years For Which the Organizations Have Been Using IBM PC
Years

Number of

Percentage

Respondents
Not Available

2

4.76

Under 3 years

1

2.38

3 - 5 years

9

21. 43

6 - 8 years

19

45.24

Over 8 years

11

26.19

42

100.00

5.2. 6 Network connections
In 28 (66.67%) of the 42 organizations, at least one networking system is in place.
The number of separate networking systems in use in the organizations is
summarised in Table 12. There are a total of 63 separate networking systems in
used in the 28 organizations.
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Table 12
Number of Separate Networking Systems In Use in the Organizations
Percentage

Number of Separate

Number of

Networking Systems

Respondents

Total Number of
Networking

Systems
1
2

15
7

53.57

15

25.00

14

3

3

10. 71

9

4

1

3.57

4

9

1

3.57

9

12

1

3.57

12

28

100.00

63

5.2. 7 Number of IBM PC in each of the networks in the organizations
The number of IBM PCs in each of the 63 networking systems in the organizations
is summarised in Table 13. The majority of the networking systems (72.13%) have
between I and 30 IBM PCs linked to it. On average, the number of IBM PCs that
are linked to the networks in the organizations is 50.
Table 13
Number of IBM PC in the Networking Systems of the Organizations
Number of

Number of

IBM PC

Respondents

Not Available
1

-

10

2

3.17

11

17.46

20

14

22.22

30

30.16

50

19
7

11.11

51 - 100

4

6.35

101 - 200

4

6.35

Over 200

2

3.17

63

100.00

11
21
31

=

-

Percentage

-

Mean= 49.51
50
Standard Deviation= 97.81

= 98

5.2.8 Use of network operating systems in the organizations
The network operating system (NOS) of the 63 networking systems m the
organizations is set out in Table 14.
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Table 14
Network Operating System of the Networking Systems in the Organizations
Network Operating

Number of

System

Respondents

Not Available

8

Percentage
12.70

Novell NetWare

26

41. 27

3Com 3+ Open

11

17.46

IBM OS/2 LAN Server

7

11.11

PC NFS

4

6.35

IBM LAN Manager

3

4.76

LANTastic

1

1. 59

Banyan VINES

1

1. 59

Microsoft LAN Manager

1

1. 59

Pathwork

1

1. 59

63

100.00

5.2.9 Effect of non-availability of networks in the organizations
The effect of non-availability of each networking system in the organizations is
summarised in Table 15.
Table 15
Effect of Non-availability of Networks in the Organizations
Effect

Number of

Percentage

Respondents
Minimal
Inconvenience
Major

14

22.22

7

11.11

42

66.67

63

100.00

5.2.10 External connections
In 15 (35.71%) of the 42 organizations, external dial-in capabilities are allowed.
Only 4 (26.67%) of the 15 organizations use a dial-back system to allow only
access from an approved list of numbers. Nine (81.82%) out of the 11
organizations that do not use the dial-back system are relying on the password
mechanism to prevent unauthorised access. In addition to password protection,
three (27.27%) other organizations disclosed that the use of a dial-back system is
unnecessary because all external person can only dial into a single stand-alone
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personal computer within the organization. One (9.09%) other organization
revealed that the use of dial-back system is unnecessary because the dial-in
capabilities are normally disabled and are not used very frequently.

5.3 IBM PC Virus Problem Experience

5.3.1 Seriousness of the IBM PC viruses problem in the organizations
The following table summarises the perceived seriousness of the IBM PC viruses
problem in the organizations. Of particular note is that the majority of the
respondents (57.14%) believe that IBM PC viruses only pose a minor problem in
their respective organizations.

Table 16
Perceived Seriousness of the IBM PC Viruses Problem in the Organizations
Seriousness of the problem

Number of

Percentage

Respondents
No problem

15

Only a minor problem

24

35.71
57.14

A reasonable serious problem

2

4.76

A major problem

1

2.38

42

100.00

5.3.2 Number of organizations that had IBM PC viruses infection
There were a total of27 (64.29%) organizations reported to have at least one IBM
PC virus infection over the years. The following table summarises the number of
times the 27 organizations have had an IBM PC virus infection. It reveals that the
majority of the organizations (55.56%) have between 1 and 4 infections over the
years.
In terms of number of separate incidents, the organizations have an average
of 15 incidents with a S.D. of 39. However, it should be noted that there is an
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organization which has a very large number of occurrences (200 times). If this
organization were excluded from the calculation, the number of separate incidents
of the organizations, on average, will be 8, with a S.D. of 10. These figures are
believed to be more representative than the previous figures since it is rather
unusual to have this large number of infections.
Table 17
Number of IBM PC Virus Infection in the Organizations
Number of

Number of

Infections

Respondents

Percentage

Infections

1

4

14.81

4

2

5

18.52

10

3

2

7.41

6

4

4

14.81

16

5

1

3. 70

5

6

2

7.41

12

7

1

3. 70

7

9

1

3. 70

9

12

1

3. 70

12

16

1

3. 70

16

20

1

3. 70

20

26

1

3. 70

26

30

1

3. 70

30

31

1

3. 70

31

200

1

3. 70

200

100.00

404

27
Mean= 14.96

Total

= 15

Standard Deviation= 38.04

= 39

5. 3. 3 Types of PC virus infections
The number of incident of IBM PC viruses by types in the organizations in the
periods prior to 1991, during 1991, and as of April 1992 is summarised in Table
18.
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Table 18
Number of IBM PC Viruses by Types in the Organizations
Types

New Zealand

Prior to

During

As of

1991 36

1991

April 1992

No

%

83

20.54

No

%

No

Total

%

No

%

99

24.50

7

1. 73

189

46.78

132

32.67

6

1. 4 9

138

34.16

(Stoned,
Marijuana)
Michelangelo
Liberty (Magic,

3

0.74

28

6.93

1

0.25

32

7.92

2

0.50

5

1. 24

1

0.25

8

1. 98

Den Zuk (Search)

6

1. 4 9

6

1. 49

Ohio (Hacker)

5

1. 24

5

1. 24

Keypress (Turku,

3

0.74

4

0.99

Dark Avenger

3

0.74

3

0.74

Italian (Pingpong,

3

0.74

3

0.74

No-Int 37

2

0.50

3

0.74

Flip

2

0.50

2

0.50

Mystic)
Jerusalem
(Jerusalem B)

1

0.25

Twins)

Friday the 15th,
Israel)
1

0.25

1559

1

0.25

1

0.25

1575

1

0.25

1

0.25

Form

1

0.25

1

0.25

Slow
Unknown

1
Total

36

89

1

0.25

1

0.25

0.25

6

1. 4 9

7

1. 73

22.03

295

73. 02

404

100.00

4.95

The data from the survey show that the first incidents of IBM PC virus attacks among
the respondents occurred in 1989.

37

20

No-Int is a variant of New Zealand.
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5.3.4 Number of PC infected during each infection in the organizations
The number of IBM PC infected during each of the IBM PC Viruses infections in
the organizations is shown in Table 19.
Table 19 reveals that there were a total of 6490 PCs (including reinfection)
infected as a result of the 404 incidents. On average, this gives rise to an average of
16.06 PCs being infected in each of the incidents. However, it should be noted that
there is an organization which has a very large number of occurrences (200 times),
with 30 PCs infected during each of the 200 infections. If this organization were
excluded from the calculation, there were a total of 460 PCs being infected in 204
separate incidents, with an average of 2.25 PCs being infected per incident. These
figures are believed to be more representative than the previous figures because the
very large number of infections in the particular organization is really a unique case
and should not be treated as the same with the other cases.

Table 19

Number of IBM PC Infected During Each Infection in the Organizations
Number of PC

Number of

Infected

Respondents

Percentage

Total PC
Infected

0

3

0.74

0

1

127

31. 4 4

127

2

50

12.38

100

3

3

0.74

9

4

2

0.50

8

5

3

0.74

15

6

1

0.25

6

10

3

0.74

30

13

10

2.48

130

30

201

4 9. 7 5

6030

35

1

0.25

35

404

100.00

6490
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5.3.5 Time taken for the eradication of each incident in the organiza.tions
The following table summarises the time taken for each of the viruses to be cleaned
or removed from PC. In 2 separate incidents, the viruses, contained in floppy disks,
were detected before any PC was infected. Therefore, there was no need to
eradicate the viruses from PC for these 2 incidents.
Table 20 shows that more than 84% of the organizations took less than 10
minutes to perform the clean-up procedures in the event of an IBM PC virus
attack. However, in 5 separate incidents, the clean-up took between 1 and 3 days.

Table 20
Time Taken to Clean the Virus in Each Incident in the Organizations
Time Taken

Number of

Percentage

Respondents
Not Applicable
l - 10 minutes
20 minutes
30 minutes

2

0.50

340

84.16

8

1. 98

19

4.70

1 - 2 hours

12

2.97

2 - 3 hours

15

3.71

3 - 5 hours

3

0.74

1 1/2 day

2

0.50

2 - 3 days

3

0.74

404

100.00

5.3. 6 Additional costs associated with each infection in the organizations
Of the 27 organizations that have at least one encounter with an IBM PC viruses,
only 2 (7.41 %) reported to have additional costs associated with each clean-up of
the infecting viruses. On one occasion, external contractor had to be asked to solve
the problem, twice, which cost approximately a total of $300. In the other incident,
hard disks drives had to be purchased as a result of the incident, which eventually
cost the organization a total of $500.
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5.3. 7 Major perpetrators classification
Table 21 compares reported occurrences of IBM PC virus incidents according to
the broad classifications of user staff, computer staff, external personnel, software
vendor, and those unable to be identified
The table indicates that approximately 80% of the perpetrations can be
attributed to the user staff of the organizations with those unable to be identified
make up the other 20% of the perpetrations.
Table 21
Person Responsible for Introducing the Virus to the Organizations
Perpetrator

Number of

Percentage

Respondents
315

77. 97

Computer staff

User staff

6

1. 49

External personnel

2

0.50

Software vendor

1

0.25

80

19.80

404

100.00

Unknown

5.3.8 Actions taken as a result of each infection in the organiza,tions
The following table summarises the action (or actions) taken as a result of each of
the IBM PC virus incidents in the organizations. Of particular note is that in the
aftermath of 65.84% of the incidents no action whatsoever was taken by the
victimised organizations.
Table 22
Actions Taken in Each of the Incidents in the Organizations
Action Taken

Number of

Percentage

Respondents
None

266

Formal Enquiry

65.84

2

0.50

Informal Enquiry

45

11.14

Educate User

91

22.52

404

100.00

(Awareness Campaign)
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5.4 IBM PC Virus Controls

This section is devoted to a review of the control mechanisms and procedures in
relation to IBM PC viruses that are used in the organizations surveyed.
!•

5.4.1 Formal reporting and recording of IBM PC viruses procedures in
the organizations
In 17 (40.48%) of the 42 organizations formal reporting and recording of IBM PC
viruses procedures are employed. Of those who do not keep a log of the incidents
(n

= 25), 44% (n = 11) cited IBM PC viruses, as a form of computer abuse, is a

relatively minor problem in their organization and therefore, recording of the
incidents is not necessary. Another 28% (n = 7) claimed that a log is unnecessary
because they have never had any infection before.

5.4.2 Formal IBM PC viruses clean-up procedures in the organizations
In this paper, / ormal clean-up procedures is taken to mean that in the event of a
virus attack, an organization has some means to eradicate the infecting viruses.
Anti-viral software are usually used to perform the clean-up procedures.
The survey has found that in 39 (92.86%) of the 42 organizations formal
clean-up procedures of IBM PC viruses are employed. Of those who have no
formal clean-up of IBM PC viruses procedures, 100% (n = 3) cited because they
have never had any encounter with any IBM PC viruses before, therefore the cleanup procedures are not necessary.
i

::
)'

\
I

I
I

I :
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5.4.3 Formal Contingency (or Disaster Recovery) Plan

in the

organiza.tions
In 11 (26.19%) of the 42 organizations a formal Contingency plan in relation to
IBM PC viruses is adopted to ensure minimal interruption to normal business
operations to the organization's IBM PCs in the event of an IBM PC virus attack.

5.4.4 Storing of back-up copies of original software in the organizations
In 26 (92.86%) of the 28 organizations that have networking systems, there is a
policy that prescribes storing back-up copies of original software for IBM PCs that
are linked to the networks as soon as the package is open. However, only 4
(14.29%) out of the 26 organizations store back-up copies of original software at
the offsite location. In 39 (92.86%) of the 42 organizations, back-up copies of
original software used in stand-alone IBM PCs are stored as soon as the package is
open. However, only 8 (19.05%) out of the 39 organizations store the back-up
copies at the offsite location, as illustrated in Table 23.

Table 23
Storing of Back-up Copies of Original Software in the Organizations

Back-up
Onsite

Software In

No Back-up

Total

Offsite

No

%

%

No

%

22

78. 57

4

14.29

2

7.14

28

100

31

73.81

8

19.05

3

7.14

42

100

No

%

No

Networked PCs
Software In
Stand-alone PCs

5.4.5 Creating of back-up copies of all applications and data in the
organiza.tions
In all ( 100%, n = 28) organizations that have networking systems, there is a policy
that prescribes creating back-up copies of all applications and associated data for
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IBM PCs that are linked to the networks on a regular basis. Seventeen (60. 71 % ) of
the 28 organizations create back-ups on a daily basis; two (7.14%) create back-ups
once a week; and nine (32.14%) do not have a fixed date to create back-ups.
For stand-alone IBM PCs, a policy that prescribes creating back-up copies
of all applications and data are found in only 3 (7.14%) out of the 42
organizations. In other words, in 92.86% of organizations, the onus is on the users
of the stand-alone PCs to create their own back-up regularly. This is
understandable because it is generally not economically feasible to perform back-up
on behalf of all of the users of stand-alone PCs within an organization.

Table 24
Creating of Back-up Copies of All Applications and Data in the Organizations

Software In Networked PCs
Software In Stand-alone PCs

Creating Back-up

No Back-up

No

No

Total

%

No

28

100.00

0

0.00

28

100.00

3

7.14

39

92.86

42

100.00

%

%

5.4. 6 Testing of back-up and recovery procedures in the organizations
There is a policy that prescribes testing standard procedures for back-up and
recoveries for IBM PCs that are linked to the networks in 21 (75%) of the 28
organizations that have networking systems. However, for stand-alone IBM PCs, a
policy that prescribes testing standard procedures for back-up and recoveries for
IBM PCs is found in only 4 (9.52%) out of the 42 organizations. Table 25 depicts
the frequency with which the organizations carry out the testing of the back-up and
recovery procedures. Table 26 depicts the last time with which the organizations
test the back-up and recovery procedures.
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Table 25
Frequency with Which the Organizations Carry Out the
Testing of the Back-up and Recovery Procedures
Number of

Percentage

Respondents

14

56.00

Once a Month

1
2
2

Twice A Year

3

Once a Year

3

4.00
8.00
8.00
12.00
12.00

25

100.00

When Changes Are
Introduced
Daily
Once A Week

Table 26
The Last Time the Testing of the Back-up and Recovery
Procedures was Carried Out in the Organizations
Number of

Percentage

Respondents
Within The Last Two Weeks

4

Four Weeks Ago

3

Two Months Ago

3

Six Months Ago

7

Nine Months Ago

1

One Year Ago

6
1

16.00
12.00
12.00
28.00
4.00
24.00
4.00

25

100.00

Two Years Ago

5.4. 7 Assigning personnel to specific responsibilities regarding back-up
procedures in the organizations
In 24 (85.71%) of the 28 organizations that have networking systems, personnel is
assigned to specific responsibilities regarding back-up procedures for IBM PCs
that are linked to the networks. However, all 42 organizations (100%) do not see a
need to assign personnel to specific responsibilities regarding back-up procedures
for all stand-alone IBM PCs, as shown in Table 27.
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Table 27
Assigning Personnel to Specific Responsibilities Regarding
Back-up Procedures in the Organizations

Software In

Assign Personnel

No Personnel Assigned

No

%

No

24

85.71

0

0.00

Total

%

No

%

4

14.29

28

100

32

100.00

32

100

Networked PCs
Software In
Stand-alone PCs

5.4. 8 Antiviral software used in the organizations

In 37 (88.10%) of the organizations, at least one antiviral software package or
system is used to ensure minimal interruption to normal business operations to the
organization's IBM PCs in the event of an IBM PC virus attack. The number of
antiviral software used in the organizations is set out in Table 28. The types of the
individual antiviral software used in the organizations is listed in Table 29.
Table 28
Number of Antiviral Software Used in the Organizations
Number of Antiviral

Number of

Software Used

Respondents

Percentage

Total Number of
A. Software

1

27

72.97

27

2

8

21.62

16

3

1

2. 70

3

4

1

2.70

4

37

100.00

50
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Table 29

Antiviral Software Used in the Organizations
Antiviral

Number of

Software

Respondents

Percentage

22

44.00

Virus Buster

6

12.00

Scan
Doctor Solomon's Toolkit

5

Norton AntiVirus

5

10.00
10.00
6.00

IBM Virus Scan

3

Virucide

2

4.00

Central Point Software

1

2.00

F Prot

1

2.00

Flu Shot Plus

1

2.00

Victor Charlie

1

2.00

ViruSafe

1

2.00

Virustop

1

2.00

Virusfix

1

2.00

50

100.00

5.4.9 Software acquisition policy in the organiza,tions
In 35 (83.33%) of organizations, a Software Acquisition policy is maintained to
control and inspect all software brought into the organization's IBM PCs. For
those who have a Software Acquisition policy (n = 35):
•

97.14% (n = 34) of respondents prescribe purchasing software only from
reputable vendors and accepting only software received in original sealed
packaging;

•

74.29% (n = 26) of respondents prescribe reviewing, inspecting and testing
new software as well as upgrades to existing software before installation;
and

•

74.29% (n = 26) of respondents accept shareware or freeware into their
organizations' IBM PCs. Twenty four (92.31%) of the 26 organizations
that accept shareware or freeware into their organizations' IBM PCs will
test any shareware or freeware prior to use in production.
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Chapter Six
Discussion of the Survey

6.1 Organization Profiles

The data in Tables 4, 5 and 6 indicate the sizes of the organizations included in the
survey. The organizations surveyed are generally large, with over 52% of them
having between 51 and 300 staff and approximately 90% of them having a
computing (or computer services or IT) section. However, these sections are, in

general, small with 58% of them having less than 10 staff.

6.2 Profile of the IBM PC Use

6.2.1 IBM PC
The data in Table 7 confirms the view that IBM PCs are in wide spread use with
approximately 12% of those surveyed having more than 500 IBM PCs in their
organization and that on average, the number of IBM PCs each organization owns
is 170.
The data in Table 9 suggests that there is almost a one for one
correspondence between the number of IBM PCs and the number of IBM PC
users. This is significant from a computer virus research perspective because it
implies that there is unlikely to be a large population using the one machine or
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several machines and sharing disks. Thus, the likelihood of transmitting viruses
through sharing disks may be reduced.
The data in Table 11 show that the organizations surveyed are experienced
with more than 71 % of them having over 6 years of experience with IBM PC ( and
clones) environment, given that IBM PC (and clones) has been available in
Australia for approximately a decade. Again this is significant from a computer
virus research perspective as experienced users are more likely to be aware of the
problems and transfer mechanisms associated with computer viruses.

6.2.2 Apple Macintosh
Although this survey was not examining computer viruses associated with Apple
Macintosh PCs, data was gathered on these PCs because it was considered
worthwhile to establish the penetration of these systems into the PC market in the
State Government sector to consider whether research into Apple Macintosh
viruses could be justified. If these Macintosh systems represented a significantly
high proportion of investment then more attention could be devoted to addressing
virus problems in this environment.
As it transpired, the data in Table 8 show that approximately 80% of the
organizations surveyed had less than 15 Macintoshs and 43% had none at all. In
fact, Table 10 shows that 75% of the organizations had less than 10 staff who
regularly used Macintosh computers. These data suggest that the most common
businness PC in use in this sector was the IBM style machine. This area would then
be most likely to be require more attention for support in virus research.

6.2.3 Network connections
The transfer of computer viruses across networks has been seen as a major threat
and the data in Tables 12 show that the use of IBM PC style networks is
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reasonably common with two third of the organisations surveyed having at least
one newtork of this type. Table 13 shows that 15% of these networks have more
than 50 PCs linked to them.
The types of network operating system (NOS) environments are listed in
Table 14 and the implications for virus security differs in each case. Table 14
shows that the two most popular NOSs are Novell's NetWare and 3COM's 3+
Open. This is in accordance with Christianson, King, & Munger's (1990, p. 6)
claim that "the most popular NOS is NetWare, ... which has an estimated 65% of
market share" and that "3+ Open ... is probably the second most popular system,
with about a 10-15% market share."
The data in Table 15 show that in two third of the cases, if the network in
use in the organizations were put out of action, it would have major effects on
company operation. This suggests that organizations have increasingly come to
reply on the use of network systems and that the non-availability of these systems
would have far reaching consequences to the affected organizations. Therefore,
from the standpoint of computer virus reseach, network security is a worth-while
effort.

6.2.4 External connections

'

'

' '''

i

It is also argued that the use of dial-in/out connections has the potential to transfer
viruses in much the same way as a network but is even more dangerous in that
external intrusion may occur. In only 3 5% of the organizations surveyed was
external dial-in capability allowed. However, only 26% of these organizations use a
dial-back system to allow only access from an approved list of numbers. Most of
the 11 organizations that do not use the dial back system are relying on stand-alone
systems and the password mechanism to prevent unauthorised access.
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6.3 IBM PC Virus Problem Experience

6.3.1 Perceived seriousness
With regard to the perceived seriousness of computer virus infections, Table 16
shows that more than one third (3 5%) of the respondents did not see any problem.
i

Another 58% claim it was only a minor problem. In fact only 7% of the

·,)

respondents regard computer virus infections as reasonably serious or as a major
problem.
This is a surprising result and may reflect the mechanisms and procedures
which have been established effectively to prevent computer viruses becoming a
problem. For example, Table 28 shows that more than 88% of the organizations
have at least one antiviral software and that more than 84% of the organizations
(from Table 20) claimed that it took them less than 10 minutes to perform the
clean-up procedures in the event of an IBM PC virus attack.

'

'

/

I

It may even be that the use of anti-viral software has lulled users into a false
sense of security thinking they are "protected" against viruses (Zajac, 1992, p.
225). However, it should be noted that anti-viral software is not a panacea because
it will not protect against all viruses but only the known ones. Furthermore, it is
possible that even with an anti-viral program in place, an organization could still be
a victim of an attack because the virus had a new twist to beat the anti-viral
software. To quote Zajac (1992, p. 225), "anti-viral software is only a treatment,
not a cure or vaccine to the viral problem."

6.3.2 Infection type
The main purpose of this study was to investigate and quantify the infection types
and rates of IBM PC viruses in the Western Australian State Government
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organizations. Table 18 shows that there were a total of 15 unique IBM PC viruses
that were known to infect the responding organizations.
The following table shows the types of each of the 15 unique IBM PC
viruses that are known to have infected the responding organizations, and the
damage done by these viruses. As mentioned, this classification method is based on

the one used by VIRUSCAN Version 8.4B89 (1992).

Table 30

Infection Types of the 15 Known IBM PC Viruses in the
Organizations and the Damage Done by These Viruses
Type *

Name of Virus
1559
1575
Dark Avenger
Den Zuk
(Search)
Flip
Form
Italian
(Pingpong, Friday the 15th, Israel)
Jerusalem
(Jerusalem Bl
Keypress
(Turku, Twins)
Liberty
(Magic, Mystic)
Michelangelo
New Zealand
(Stoned, Marijuana)
No-Int
(New Zealand, Stoned, Marijuana)
Ohio
(Hacker)
Slow

*

2,3,4,5,6
3,4,5,6
3,4,5,6,7
3,8

O,P,L
O,P,L
O,P,L
O,B

2,3,4,5,6,7
3,8,9
3,8,9

O,P,D,L
8,0,D
O,B

3,5,6,7

O,P

3,4,5,6

O,P,D

3,4,5,6,7

O,P

3, 8, 9,A
3, 8,A

8,0
0,8,L

3,8,A

O,B,L

3,8

8,0

2,3,5,6,7

O,P,L

Type Codes
1 = Virus uses Stealth Techniques
2 = Virus uses self-encryption
3
Virus install self in memory
4
Infects COMMAND. COM
5
Infects COM files
6
Infects EXE files
7 = Infects overlay files
8
Infects floppy diskette boot
9
Infects fixed disk boot sector
A= Infects fixed disk partition table
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**

Damage Fields
B = Corrupts or overwrites the boot sector
D = Corrupts data files
F

= Formats or overwrites all/part of disk

L = Directly or indirectly corrupts file linkage
0 = Affects system run-time operation
P = Corrupts program or overlay files

From Table 30, it is apparent that of the 15 known viruses that are known to have
infected the respondents:
•

none (0%) of them uses Stealth techniques;

•

3 (20%) of them use self-encryption techniques;

•

all 15 (100%) of them are memory-resident after infection;

•

6 (40%) of them infect COMMAND. COM file;

•

8 (53.33%) of them infect COM files;

•

8 (53.33%) of them infect EXE files;

•

5 (33.33%) of them infect overlay files;

•

7 (46.67%) of them infect floppy diskette boot;

•

3 (20%) of them infect fixed disk boot sector; and

•

3 (20%) of them infect fixed disk partition table (aka master boot
record).

Table 30 also shows that of the 15 known viruses that are known to have infected
the respondents:
•

all 15 (100%) of them affect system run-time operation;

•

8 (53.33%) of them corrupt program or overlay files;

•

7 (46.67%) of them directly or indirectly corrupt file linkage

•

7 (46.67%) of them corrupt or overwrite the boot sector;

•

3 (20%) of them corrupt data files; and

•

none (0%) of them formats or overwrites all or part of disk.
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6.3.3 Reinfection rate
In this paper, reinfection is taken to mean that a particular computer virus reinfects
an organization's PC (or PCs) after the first infection of the same virus has been
eradicated.
Reinfection occurred in 18 (66.67%) of the 27 organizations that had at
least one encounter with an IBM PC virus over the years. Table 31 shows the
number of times the reinfection of the viruses in the organizations had occurred.
From Table 31, it is evident that over 47% of the time reinfection 1s
occurred only once and that there were a total of 333 reinfections out of a total of
404 separate incidents, which makes the reinfection rate stands at 82.43%.

Table 31
Number of Reinfections of Viruses in the Organizations
Number of Times

Number of

Reinfected

Respondents

Percentage

Total Number of
Reinfections

1

16

47.06

2

1

2.94

2

4

4

11. 76

16

5

2

5.88

10

7

1

2. 94

7

9

2

5.88

18
11

16

11

1

2. 94

14

3

8.82

42

19

1

2.94

19

26

1

2.94

26

67

1

2. 94

67

1

2.94

99

34

100.00

333

99

6.3.4 Spafford's (1990) speculation
The data in Table 18 show that 4 IBM PC viruses (i.e., New Zealand,
Michelangelo, Liberty, and Jerusalem) account for 367 out of the 404 incidents

in the responding organizations, or an equivalent of90.84% of all infections.
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Thus, Spafford's speculation that less than 10 viruses account for 90% of
all infections holds true in the Western Australian State Government organizations
environment.

6.3.5 Comparison with the 1991 Dataquest survey
A comparison of the known infecting viruses with Dataquest's 1991 Computer
Virus Market Survey is tabulated in Table 32.

Table 32
A Western Australia - U.S. Computer Viruses by Types Comparison of Infections
Computer

United States

Western Australia

Virus

48%
37%

New Zealand
Jerusalem
Joshi

4 6. 7 8%
1. 98%

8%
34.16%
7.92%

Michelangelo
Liberty

93%

90.84%

The most striking aspect of Table 32 is that Spafford's (1990) speculation that less
than 10 viruses account for 90% of infections holds true for both surveys.
Dataquest's survey reveals that 63% of respondents reported at least one
encounter with a virus in 1991 whereas the present study's survey shows that
64.29% of the responding organizations reported at least one IBM PC vtrus
infection over the years.

6. 3. 6 Major perpetrators classification
The data from Table 21 indicates that the user staff of the organizations account
for approximately 80% of the perpetrations with those unable to be identified
nearly make up the other 20% of the perpetrations. Clearly, this is an area where

I

!

,'1

effective control can be applied. The user staff of the organizations have to be
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educated to be aware of the viruses problem, and means by which viruses can be
transmitted. By doing so, the threat of the viruses may be reduced since
collectively, the user staff of the organizations account for 8 out of 10
perpetrations.

6.4 IBM PC Vims Controls

Prior to the commencement of this study it had been assumed that there would be
difficulty in both detecting whether particular problems had been caused by viruses
and secondly if a particular problem had been encountered had the virus been
identified. As it transpired, the interview situation in which the questionnaire was
administered provided an indication that the anticipated virus identification
problems did not arise in that the organizations surveyed appeared to be well
informed and have the tools to identify viruses infecting them. Of all the viruses
detected only seven incidents (1.73%) could not be identified positively.
A close examination of the data showed that the control mechanisms and
procedures of the organizations surveyed, in general, are adequate. For example:
•

formal clean-up of IBM PC viruses procedures are in place in over 92% of
the organizations;

•

over 92% of the organizations prescibe storing, mostly onsite, back-up
copies of original software that are used in both networked and stand-alone

PCs; 38
•

all organizations (100%) prescribe creating back-up copies of all
applications and associated data for networked PCs on a regular basis;

38

This is to allow restoration of a system that has been contaminated by a time-released

virus.
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•

the standard procedures for back-up and recoveries for the networked IBM
PCs are tested and reviewed regularly in 75% of the organizations that have
networking system;

•

personnel

are

assigned

specific responsibilities

regarding

back-up

procedures in over 85% of the organizations that have networking systems;
•

over 88% of the organizations use at least one anti-viral software package
to ensure minimal interruption to normal business operations to their IBM
PCs in the event of an IBM PC virus attack;

•

a Software Acquisition policy is maintained m over 83% of the
organizations to control and inspect all software brought into their IBM
;

;

PCs; and

•

I

no fewer than 74% of the organizations that have the Software Acquisition
policy realise the importance of
purchasing software only from reputable vendor and accepting only
software received in original sealed packaging;
reviewing, inspecting and testing new software as well as upgrades
to existing software before installation; and
testing any shareware, freeware in quarantine (e.g., test or
development machine or stand-alone PCs) prior to use m
production.

Nevertheless, there are two aspects of the virus control mechanisms and procedures in
the organizations that are found to be inadequate: only approximately 40% of the
organizations keep a formal reporting and recording of the virus incidents in their
organizations; and a Contingency (or Disaster Recovery) plan in relation to IBM PC
viruses are in place in only 26% of the organizations.
To effectively control the virus problem, the importance of having a
Contingency plan and keeping a log of all virus incidents cannot be stressed enough.
'.,

,t•

,
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Given that the organizations surveyed are, in general, large with many staff (as shown
in Tables 4, 5, and 6) and that the user organizations are experienced with more than
70% having more than 5 years experience with the IBM PC (and compatibles)
environment, one would assume that these two aspects of virus controls would not be
overlooked. One clue to this phenomenon may be that over 92% of the respondents
regard computer virus infections as a relatively minor problem. Nevertheless,
regardless of the reasons, these two aspects of virus controls are very important and
should receive increased consideration.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
7.1 Summary of the Survey Findings

The major findings from an analysis of this survey are that:
•

With regard to the perceived seriousness of computer virus infections, over
92% of the respondents regard computer virus infections as a relatively minor
problem.

•

64.29% of respondents reported at least one encounter with an IBM PC
virus during the period from 1989 to April 1992;

•

Over 55% of the organizations surveyed have between 1 and 4 infections
during the period from 1989 to April 1992; the average number of incidents
per organization is 8;

•

With the exception of one organization, 2.25 PCs, on average, were
infected in each incidents, which is negligible when compared to an average
of 170 PCs each organization owns;

•

New Zealand (or Stoned or Marijuana) was responsible for 46.78% of

all attacks, Michelangelo for 34.16%, Liberty (or Mystic or Magic) for
7.92% and Jerusalem (or Jerusalem B) for 1.98%; together these 4
viruses account for over 90% of all infections;
•

Over 84% of respondents reported that the clean-up procedures of the
infecting viruses took less than 10 minutes;
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•

Apart from interruption of business operations and loss of productivity,
additional costs associated with each clean-up of the infecting viruses is
reported in approximately 7% of cases;

•

In 78% of cases, the infecting viruses were introduced by the user staff of
the organizations;

•

No action (other than clean-up) was taken in the aftermath of 66% of the
incidents;

•

Over 59% of the organizations do not have a formal reporting and
recording of viruses procedures;

•

Formal clean-up of IBM PC viruses procedures are in place in over 92% of
the organizations;

•

Over 73% of the organizations do not have a formal Contingency (or
disaster recovery) plan in relation to computer viruses;

•

Over 92% of the organizations prescibe storing, mostly onsite, back-up
copies of original software that are used in both networked and stand-alone
PCs;

•

All organizations (100%) prescribe creating back-up copies of all
applications and associated data for networked PCs on a regular basis;

•

The standard procedures for back-up and recoveries for the networked
IBM PCs are tested and reviewed regularly in 75% of the organizations
that have networking system;

•

Personnel are assigned

specific responsibilities

regarding

back-up

procedures in over 85% of the organizations that have networking systems;
•

Over 88% of the organizations use at least one anti-viral software package
to ensure minimal interruption to normal business operations to their IBM
PCs in the event of an IBM PC virus attack; and
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•

A Software Acquisition policy is maintained in over 83% of the
organizations to control and inspect all software brought into their IBM
PCs.

7.2 Future Research Directions

7.2.1 Comparison study with other states and sectors
The present study was designed to investigate the State Government IT sector of
W estem Australia. Clearly this study was based on assumptions of homogeneity
across Australia and other sectors which may not hold. Some future comparison
study with other states and sectors would be a fruitful area for further research to
test this assumption.

7.2.2 Follow up study
A follow up study to examine trends in frequency and type of virus is worthy of
some future study as it is expected further viruses of the current types in addition
to new types will become manifest for some time yet.

7.2.3 Detailed analysis
A detailed analysis of the relationships between the number and type of computer
viruses and other factors (e.g., size of organization, size of network) to examine
whether a different scale of operation and infrastructure may affect outcomes in
this field is another area worthy of some further study.
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7.2.4 Taxonomy of viruses by types
As mentioned in section 1.4, there is general disagreement among researchers
regarding the classification of the various viruses by types and this debate is likely
to continue. Nevertheless, perhaps clarification could be achieved in the concepts
of "generic viruses" which could be categorised in a taxonomy. This would be a
fruitful area for further research although the changing nature of viruses must leave
this open to continual adjustment.

7.2.5 Universal Virus Detector (UVD)
A UVD is a program which can perform static or dynamic analysis of programs
and determine with 100% certainty whether the programs contain a virus or not.
The most difficult task would be for the UVD to determine when a virus infection
had actually occurred. This is partially because of the lack of a precise definition of
the term "virus". One solution is to develop "generic viruses" which will be of great
help in developing a generic virus defence or collection of generic strategies.

7.2. 6 Stealth Viruses Detection
Another area worthy of further research is to propose mechanisms and techniques
for the detection of the so-called "Stealth" viruses. This area is rather specific in
that the research will only concentrate on the detection methods of one of many
types of viruses. This area also represents specific leading area research in the
computer virus field.
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7.3 Conclusion
This paper presents the results of an extensive survey undertaken in a number of
government based user environments in Western Australia. The study has
accomplished several objectives:
•

It provides factual information regarding the nature and prevalence of the

virus infections in the Western Australian environment, in particular, the
infection types and rates of IBM PC viruses in the W.A. State Government
sector;
•

It sets a base line of viruses information for government organizations in
W.A. and provides a comparison with overseas findings;

•

It provides current evidence that there is a problem m the work
environment in W.A. as opposed to the creation and isolation of computer
viruses in laboratories of computer science;

•

It identifies what other people are doing with similar problems or situations
and benefit from their experience in making future plans and decisions;

•

It ratifies the propositions that currently very few of the viruses contribute

to the vast majority of infections in the Western Australian workplace.
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991)
(adapted from "Known IBM", 1991)
Name
8 Tunes
10-past-3
268-Plus
432
483
535A
555
777 Revenge
800
905
928
1024PrScr
1028
1067
1077
1226
1260
1575
1600
2100
2144
2480
3445
5120
4K
Advent
Aircop
Agiplan
AIDS
AIDS II
Akuku
Alabama
Ambulance
Amoeba
Amstrad
Amstrad-852
Amstrad-877
Anthrax
AntiCAD
AntiCAD 2576
AntiCAD/Plastique

*

Aliases

Dutch 555

V2Pl

4096, Frodo, IDF, Israeli Defence Forces

RedX

Plastique
3004

Type*
CER
CR
CN
C?
CER
CN
CER
CR
CR
ER
CER
CR
CER
CR
CER
CR
CN
CER
CER
CER
CER
CR
CER
CEN
CER
CEN
DR
CR
CN
PN
CER
ER
CN
CER
CN
CN
CN
MCER
CER
CER
CER

Type Codes
C = Infects COM files
D = Infects DOS boot sector (Logical Sector O on disk)
E = Infects EXE files
M = Infects master boot sector (Track O, Head O, Sector 1 on
disk)
N = Not memory-resident after infection
P = Companion virus
R = Memory-resident after infection
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991)
[continue]

Name
Anti-Pascal (1)
Anti-Pascal (2)
Apocalypse
Apocalypse II

Aliases

Type

CN
CN
CER
CER

Arf

CN

Armagedon
Attention
Australian 403
Azusa
Backtime
Bad Boy
Bandit
Bebe
Best Wishes
Big Joke
Black Monday
Bijec

CR
CR
CR
DR
CR
CR
EN

CN
CR

CN
CER

CN
CN

Blood
Beijing

Bloody!

MR

Ashar, Shoe

DR·

CN

Boys

Brain
Burger
Burger 382
Burger405

CN
CN
CN

CARA

Carioca
Cascade
Cascade YAP
Casino
Casper
Cemetery
Christmas in Japan
Christmas Tree
Christmas Violator
Cinderella

Fall, Russian, Hailstorm

CN
ER
Father Christmas, Choinka

CN
CN
CN

CR
CER
CER
CER
CER
CER
CR

Cookie
Crazy Eddie
Damage
Dark Avenger
Darklord
Darth Vader
Datacrime
Datacrime II
Datalock
dBASE
DBFBlank
December 24th
Deicide
Demon
DenZuk

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR

CN
CEN
CER
CR
CER
ER

CN
CN
DR

Search
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991)
[continue]
Name
Destructor
Devil's Dance
Diabolik
Diamond
Diamond-1173
Dir
Discom
Diskjeb
Disk Killer
Do-nothing
Doom2
Doomll-B
Dot Killer
Durban
Dyslexia
Eddie-2
Eddie-1801
E.D.V.
Enigma
Erasmus
ETC
Evil
Evil Empire
Evil Empire B
Faust
Fellowship
Fichv 2.1
Filler
Finger
Fish 6
Flash
Flip
Form
Formiche
Frog's Alley
Fu Manchu
F-word
Gergana
GhostBalls
Goblin
GPl
Gremlin
Grither
Guppy
Hallochen
Hero

Type
CER
CR
CER
CER
CER
CR
CR
CER
DR
CR
CER
CER
CN
CER
CR
CER
CER
DR
ER
CER
CN
CR
MR
MR
CER
ER
CN
DR
CER
CER
CER
MCER
DR
CR
CR
CER
CR
CN
CN
CER
CER
CER
CN
CR
CER
CER
CER
CER
CER
CN

Aliases

1024
David

Ogre

Saturday 14th
Solano
651

Spyer

USSR-417

mv
Horse
Horse group
Hybrid

Hacker, Black horse
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991)
[continue]
Name
Hymn
Icelandic
INT13
Internal
Iraqui Warrior
Italian
Itavir
Jeff
Jerusalem
Jo-Jo
Jocker
Joker-01
Joshi
July 13th
Justice
Kamikaze
Kemerovo
Kennedy
Keypress
Keypress-1228
Kiev
Klaeren
Korea
Kylie
Lehigh
Leprosy
Leprosy-B
Leszop
Liberty
Little Pieces
Lozinsky
LoveChild
Lucifer
Macho
Magnitogorsk
Mardi Bros
MG
MG-3
MG-4
MGTU
Micro-128
Microbes
Migram-1
Migram-2
Minimal-30
Minimal-45
MIR
Mirror
Mistake

Aliases
Saratoga

Pingpong, Bouncing Ball, Vera Cruz

PLO, Friday the 13th, Israeli

Type
CER
ER
CR
EN
CN
DR
EN
CN
CER
CR
CR
MR
ER
CR
EN
CN
CN
CER
CER
CR
CER
DR
CER
CR
CN
CER
DR
DCER
ER
CR
CN
CER
CEN
CER
DR
CR
CR
CR
CN
CR
DR
ER
ER
CN
CN
CER
ER
DR
ER

Turku, Twins

NJH

Magic, Mystic

2560

Typoboot

MIXl
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991)
[continue]
Name
MIX2

Type

Aliases

CER.
CR

MLTI

Monxla

Time

CN

Monxla-B
Murphy
Murphy-3
Murphy-4
Music Bug
Mutant
New Zealand
Nina
No Bock
Nomenldatura
NTKC
NumberOne
Number of the Beast
Ohio
Old Yankee
Ontario
Oropax
Paris

CN
CER.
CER.
CER
DR
CN
MR
CR
CN
CER
CN

Stoned, Marijuana
440
C-23693

CN

666, V512
Hacker

CR
DR
EN
CER.
CR
CEN
CN
CER
DR
CR
CR
CER.
CR
CER.
CR
CR
CN
CN
CN
CN
CN
CR
C?
CN
CR
CN
DR
C?
CR
EN

Music virus
TCC

Parity

PcVrsDs
Pentagon
Perfume
Perfume-731
Pest
Phantom
Phenome
Phoenix
Piter
Pixel
Pixel-257,275,295,283
Pixel-892
Pixel-779,837,850,854
Pixel-936
Plague
Plastique 521
Polimer
Polish 217
Pretoria
PrintScreen
Protecto
Proud
Prudents
PSQR
Rat
Raubkopi
Russian Mirror
Saddam

Pl
Polish 529

June 16th

ER
CR
CR
CR

Raub
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991)
[continue]
Name
Scott's Valley
Sentinel
September 18th
Sex Revolution
Shake
Simulation
Skism
Slow
Smack
South African
South African 408
South African 416
Spanish Telecom
Sparse
Staf
Striker 1
Subliminal
Sunday
Suomi
Suriv 1.01
Suriv 2.01
Suriv 3.00
SVC
SVC 3.1
Sverdlov
Svir
Swami
Swap
Swedish disaster
Swiss-143
Sylvia
Sylvia-2
Syslock
Taiwan
Taiwan-C
Taiwan-D
Tenbyte
Tequila
Terror
Testvirus B
Tiny
Tiny Family
TPworm
Traceback
Trackswap
Trilogy
Tumen
TUQ
Turbo448
TurboKukac

Aliases

Patricia
Miami, Munich, Virus-B

April 1st COM
April 1st EXE
Israeli

Guru, Bhaktivedanta

SylviaB

Valert

Spanish

Type
CER
CR
CEN
MR
CR
CN
CER
CER
CER
CN
CN
CN
MCER
CR
CN
CN
CR
CER
CN
CR
ER
CER
CER
CER
CER
EN
CER
DR
MR
CN
CN
CN
CEN
CN
CN
CN
CER
EMR
CER
CN
CN
CR
PN
CER
DR

?
CR
CN
CR
CR

RPVS

104

Honours Thesis

LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992

Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991)
[continue]
Name
Typo
USSR-311
USSR-492
USSR-516
USSR-600
USSR-696
USSR-707
USSR-711
USSR-948
USSR-1049
USSR-1594
USSR-2144
V-1
V2P2
V2P6
Vacsina
Vcomm
vcs 1.0
VFSI
Victor
Vienna
Vienna-622
Vienna-644
Vienna-645
Vienna-822
Violator
Virdem
Virdem-792
Virus-90
Virus-IOI
Virus-B
Voronezh

Aliases
Typo COM, Fumble
V-311
492
516, Leapfrog

Type

600

696
707
711
948
1049

Austrian, Unesco, DOS62, Lisbon

VP

Vriest
Wl3
Warrior
Westwood
Whale
Wisconsin
Wolfman

Death to Pascal

WWT
XAI

Yale
Yankee
Yaunch
Yukon
Zeleng
Zero Bug
Zero Hunt
ZK-900

Alameda, Merritt
Wench

Palette
Minnow
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Edith Cowan University
School of Information Technology and Mathematics
An Investigation of IBM PC Computer Viruses Infection Rates
and Types in A Western Australian Environment
Subject No. _

A. Organization Profiles
l.

To help estimate the approximate size of your organization, could you estimate the gross
actual budget for the current financial year?
$
Million dollars

2.

Approximately how many staff are employed in the whole organization?
_ _ people

3.

Does your organization have a separate computing/computer services department?
() Yes
()No

IfYES:
(a)

How many staff (e.g., Operators, Programmers, Analysts, Management,
Engineering Support, Vendor staff permanently on site, Consultant
permanently on site) are there in the computing centre?
_ _ people

B. Profile of the IBM PC Use
4.

How many IBM PCs (including IBM XT, AT, PS/2 and compatibles) are there currently
in the whole organization?

5.

How many Apple Macintoshs are there currently in the whole organization?

6.

How many staff are IBM PC users in the whole organization?
_ _ people

7.

How many staff are Macintosh users in the whole organization?
_ _ people

8.

When did your organization obtain its first IBM PC?
_ _ months/years

9.

Are any of the _ _ IBM PCs in the whole organization networked?
() Yes
()No

IfYES:
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For each network,
(i)
How many IBM PCs are linked to this network in your organization?

(ii)

What is the Network Operating System for this network?

(iii)

If this network was put out of action, this would have
( ) Minimal effect on company operation
( ) Inconvenience effect on company operation
( ) Major effect on company operation

Does your organization have Access Control Procedures that can be used for
controlling and ljmiting all unauthorised access into its IBM PCs?
()Yes
()No
lfYES:
(a)

Does the procedures prescribe
(i)
Instructing users never to leave a terminal unattended while
logged on?
()Yes
()No
(ii)

10.

Instituting such sound password standards as:
. not using common passwords that are easy to guess
. disabling vendor-supplied accounts and passwords
. changing passwords regularly
()Yes
()No

Are external dial-in capabilities allowed in your organization?
() Yes
()No
lfYES:
(a)

Does your organization use a dial-back system to allow only access from an
approved list of numbers?
() Yes
()No

C. IBM PC Virus Problem Experience
11.

How serious is the viruses problem in your organization's IBM PCs?
() No problem
( ) Only a minor problem
( ) A reasonable serious problem
( ) A major problem

12.

Has your organization had any IBM PC virus infection before?
()Yes
()No
lfYES:
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(a)

How many times has your organization had an IBM PC virus infection
(including reinfection)?
times

(b)

For each infection,
(i)
When did it occur?
- - - - (DD/MM/YY)

(ii)

Do you know the type of the infecting virus?
()Yes
()No
IfYES:
(i)
What was the type of the virus?
IfNO:
(i)

(iii)

Can you describe the symptoms of the virus?

Did you know how many IBM PCs were infected in the process?
() Yes
()No
IfYES:
(1)

How many PCs are infected in each infection?
_ _ _ PC(s)

(iv)

How long did it take for the virus to be cleared?
_ _ _. days/weeks

(v)

Were there additional costs associated with each clean-up?
() Yes
()No
IfYES:
(1)
What was the approximate cost of the clean-up?
$
dollars

(vi)

Did you identify the person or persons (or the mechanism) responsible
for introducing the virus?
() Yes
()No
IfYES:
(l)
Could you identify if it was perpetrated or assisted by a/an:
( ) User staff
( ) Computer staff
() External person (e.g., Consultant, computer service
personnel)
() Unknown
() Other (Please describe)

(vii)

What action was taken as a result of this incident?
() None
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( ) Fonnal inquiry
( ) Infonnal enquiry
() Other (Please specify)

D. IBM PC Virus Control
13.

Does your organization have any fonnal reporting and recording of IBM PC computer
viruses procedures?
()Yes
()No

IfYES:
(a)
What are they? (Please describe briefly)

14.

Does your organization have fonnal IBM PC viruses clean-up procedures? (i.e., Does
your organization assign any person responsible for the expeditious removal of
contaminated software and the recovery and restoration of destroyed or lost data and
programs?)
() Yes
()No

15.

Does your organization have a fonnal Contingency (or Disaster Recovery) Plan that can
be used to ensure minimal interruption to nonnal business operations in the event of an
IBM PC virus attack?
() Yes
()No

lfNO:
(a)
Please explain briefly the reason:
16.

Does your organization prescribe storing back-up copies of original software (e.g.,
systems software and vendor packages) at the offsite location as soon as the package is
open for use for your organization's:
(a)

stand-alone IBM PCs? (This is to allow restoration of a system that has been
contaminated by a time-released virus.)
()Yes
( ) Yes, but not at the off'site location
()No

(b)

networking systems? (if applicable)
() Yes
( ) Yes, but not at the offsite location
()No

17.

Does your organization prescribe creating back-up copies of all applications run on your
organization's:

(a)

stand-alone IBM PCs on a regular basis?
() Yes
()No
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IfYES:
(1)

(b)

How often do you create the back-up copies?

networking systems? (if applicable)
() Yes
()No
IfYES:
(1)

18.

How often do you create the back-up copies?

Does your organization prescribe instituting, updating, and testing standard procedures
for back-up and recovery for your organization's:
(a)

stand-alone IBM PCs' data and/or applications?
() Yes
() No
IfYES:

(b)

(1)

How often do you carry out the testing of your back-up and recovery
procedures?

(2)

When did you last test the back-up and recovery procedures?
_ _ _ _ months ago

networking systems' data and/or applications? (if applicable)
() Yes
()No
IfYES:

19.

(1)

How often do you carry out the testing of your back-up and recovery
procedures?

(2)

When did you last test the back-up and recovery procedures?
_ _ _ _ months ago

Does your organization prescribe assigning personnel to specific responsibilities
regarding back-up procedures for your organization's:
(a)

stand-alone IBM PCs?
() Yes
()No

(b)

networking systems? (if applicable)
()Yes

()No

111

.

LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992

Honours Thesis

20.

Does your organization have any antiviral software that can be used (to ensure minimal
interruption to normal business operations) in the event of an IBM PC virus attack?
()Yes
()No

IfYES:
(a)
How many separate antiviral software packages do you have?

(b)

21.

For each software packages,
(i)
What is the name of the antiviral software packages?

Does your organization have a Software Acquisition Policy that can be used for
controlling and inspecting all software brought into your organization's IBM PCs?
() Yes
()No

IfYES:
(a)

Does this policy prescribe
(i)
Purchasing software only from reputable vendors?
() Yes
()No

(ii)

Accepting only software received in original sealed packaging?
() Yes
()No

(iii)

Reviewing, inspecting and testing new software as well as upgrades to
existing software before installation?
() Yes
()No

(iv)

Testing any shareware, freeware, and user-developed programs in
quarantine (e.g., test/development machine or stand-alone
microcomputers) prior to use in production?
() Yes
()No
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·---·--
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Boon Guanl\...ee
Principal Investigator
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PERTH WESTERN AUSTRALIA
MOUNT LAWLEY CAMPUS
2 Bradford Street, Mount Lawley
Western Australia 6050
Telephone (09) 370 6111
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Mr Boon G Lee
3 Pindale Gardens
BALLAJURA WA 6066
Dear Mr Lee
I am pleased to advise you that the Honours and Higher Degree C0111Dittee
has determined that your research proposal is in accordance with the
standards that are required for the conduct of ethical research.
You should now proceed with the empirical phase of the study. In doing
so, you should be guided by the information contained in the University
booklet "Information for Honours, Masters and Doctoral candidates on
Research Policies and Procedures".

Yours sincerely

J CROSS
Chair
Honours and Higher Degree Conunittee
Faculty of Science and Technology

cc

Honours file
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Edith Cowan University
School of Information Technology and Mathematics
Form of Disclosure and Informed Consent
This is a written statement that describes the project to potential participants so that they may
choose whether or not to participate after reading it. A copy of the statement is made available to
participants for their records.

1.

The present study is conducted by the interviewer in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of Bachelor of Applied Science (Information Science)
Honours at Edith Cowan University. The main purpose of the study is to investigate the
infection types and rates of IBM PC viruses in limited Government I. T. organizations in
Western Australia. The data gathering instrument for this study will be a standardized
questionnaire which will comprise limited choice questions directed at obtaining such
information as infection rates and types of various computer viruses. The questionnaire
will be used by the interviewer as a basis for the interview so that the potential for
subjectivity and bias can be reduced. The participants will be assisted by the interviewer
in identifying the types of infecting viruses should the need arise.

2.

It is not anticipated that the present study will cause any discomfort or have any possible
hazards to the participants.

3.

It is anticipated that the interview will take about half an hour to be completed.

4.

The present study is significant in that knowledge about the extent and nature of IBM
PC viruses in the government sector of Western Australia can be determined. The
information will be provided to participants in summary form. No organization will be
directly identifiable from the reports developed during the study.

5.

A participant's further care will not be prejudiced in any way by his or her refusal to
participate.

6.

Any questions concerning the study entitled An Investigation of IBM PC Computer
Viruses Infection Rates and Types in a Western Australian Environment can be directed
to Mr. Boon LEE (Principal Investigator) of the Department of Computer Science on
370 6470.

I (the participant) have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been
answered to my satisfaction. I agreed to participate in this activity, realising I may withdraw at
anytime.
I agree that the research data gathered for this study may be published provided my organization
and I are not identifiable.

Participant or authorised representative

Date

Investigator

Date
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State Government IT Organizations

*

*

*

*

*

Agriculture Protection Board
Authority For Intellectually Handicapped Persons
Central Metropolitan College of TAFE
Department of Land Administration
Department of Mines
Department of Planning and Urban Development
Department of Productivity and Labour Relations
Department of State Development
Department of State Services
Department of Transport
Environmental Protection Authority
Fremantle Port Authority
Government Employees Superannuation Board
Health Department of WA
Homewest
Industrial Relations Commission
Legal Aid Commission
Lotteries Commission
Main Roads Department
Ministry of Consumer Affairs
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Premier and Cabinet
Ministry of Sport and Recreation
Museum of Western Australia
Occupational Health Safety & Welfare
Office of Racing and Gaming
Office of the Auditor General
Perth Theatre Trust
Public Service Commission
Secondary Education Authority
South Metropolitan College of TAFE
South West Development Authority
State Energy Commission (WA)
State Government Insurance Commission
State Library Services of WA
State Taxation Department
Stateships
Transperth
Treasury Department
Valuer General's Office
WA Electoral Commission
WA Fire Brigades Board
WA Police Department
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*

*

WA Regional Computing Centre
WA Tourism Commision
Water Authority of WA
Westrail
Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission

indicates not participating organizations
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